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Prefatory Note

The edition of Matthew Arnold's works used in this study is
The Works ot Matthew Arnold, 15 volumes (London and New York:
Macmillan, 1903). Citations of books in this edition are incorporated into the text, preceding or following the quotations. Book
titles are abbreviated according to the following key, and page
numbers follow the titles.
Volume No."

I

II
III
IV
V

VI
VII
VIII
IX
XI
XIII

Title

Poems, Volume One
Poems, Volume Two
Essays in Criticism, First Series
Essays in Criticism, Second Series
Discourses in America
On Translating Homer
Culture and Anarchy
Friendship's Garland
Literature and Dogma
God and the Bible
St. Paul and Protestantism
Last Essays on Church and Religion
Preface to Poems (1853)
Letters, Volume One

Abbreviation

Poems, I
Poems, II
E.inC.,I
E. in C., II
D.Amer.
Trans. H.
C. and A.
F.G.
L. and D.
G.and B.
Paul
Last E.
Pret·
Letters, I

Two other important volumes are not included in the Macmillan edition. They are Reports on Elementary Schools, 1852-1882,
edited by Sir Francis Sandford (London and New York: Mac·Some volumes, not having been used, are omitted from the list. Others contain more than one of Arnold's works. For example, Volume V contains On the
Study of Celtic Literature as well as On Translating Homer; the former book
was not consulted, so its title is not on the list.

millan, 1889), abbreviated in this study R.E.S., and The Note-Books
of Matthew Arnold, edited by H. F. Lowry, Karl Young, and W. H.
Dunn (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1952),
abbreviated N.B. Citations from these volumes are given in the same
manner as those from the Macmillan edition of the Works.
The single work of Joseph Joubert, used throughout this study,
is Pensees, Essais, Maximes et Correspondance, edited by Paul Raynal, second edition (Paris: Librairie V. de Normant, 1850). The
chapters in this work are called Titres; the aphorisms within each,
with a few exceptions, are numbered. Citations are given in the
text, in this manner: the Roman numeral signifies the chapter number, the Arabic numeral the number of the pensee. Titre XXIV has
several subdivisions, which are indicated by lower-case Roman
numerals following the chapter number. In the preface (Titre preliminaire), in Titre VI, and in the last section of Titre XXIV (vi),
the individual pensees are not numbered; citations from these sections use the page number, preceded by "p."
Two secondary sources are used with sufficient frequency to make
an abbreviated form of citation desirable. They are Louis Bonnerot,
Matthew Arnold, Poete: Essai de Biographie psychologique (Paris:
Librairie M. Didier, 1947), and Lionel Trilling, Matthew Arnold,
second edition (New York: Meridian Books, 1955). Citations in the
text consist of the name "Bonnerot" or "Trilling," followed by the
page number.

"One SingLe Ray

1/

0/

Light"

Dans la pure region de l'art, il faut eclairer son sujet avec
un rayon de lumiere unique et partant d'un seul point.
Joseph Joubert, Pensees, XXIII: 84.
He Uoubert] is the most prepossessing and convincing of
witnesses to the good of loving light. Because he sincerely
loved light, and did not prefer to it any little private darkness
of his own, he found light; his eye was single, and therefore
his whole body was full of light.
Matthew Arnold, "Joubert"
literary and critical influences which combined
to mold the thought and achievement of Matthew Arnold,
few are more pronounced or more pervasive than those
emanating from nineteenth-century France. French writers of Arnold's own time and of that immediately preceding were to him
masters and companions whose aid he fully and frequently acknowledged.
Yet the number of scholarly studies devoted to Arnold's French
sympathies are few. The only book-length study in existence is Iris
Esther Sells's Matthew Arnold and France: the Poet (New York,
1935). As the title indicates, this book confines itself to an investigation of Arnold's poetic inspiration. Moreover, it suffers from its
attempt to oversimplify Arnold's literary development by emphasizing the influence of one man-Etienne Pivert de Senancour, author of Obermann-at the expense of others whose importance is
minimized or denied. Articles, less ambitious, have been published,
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See pages 72-78 for translations of French quotations.

1

2 /

A Fugitive and Gracious Light

showing Arnold's relation to Sainte-Beuve, Renan, Sand and Vigny.1
These, however, are by no means all of Arnold's Gallic affinities,
nor even all the important ones. Certainly they are, with the exception of Senancour and probably Sainte-Beuve, no more significant in the study of Arnold's literary development than Joseph
Joubert (1754-1824), one of the last French writers to devote himself to the pensee-that literary form which the French have made
peculiarly their own-and one of the finest. Yet the only published
work on Joubert's relation to Arnold consists of brief comparisons
in the biographies by Bonnerot and Trilling.2
Joubert is, as Arnold freely admitted, not a titan in literary
stature. Because his output is small and confined to one literary
type, historians of French literature find it easy to sum him up in
a paragraph, and not many English or American readers are cognizant of his work or even of his existence. Yet Arnold thought
highly enough of Joubert to write a fairly lengthy essay about him
and to fill it with sympathetic biography, sensitive translation, and
well-nigh unstinted praise. Moreover, to the commendation in
"Joubert" Arnold added the quieter but richer praise of quotation
in many of the essays he wrote in the last twenty-five years of his
life, not a few of which are among the key statements of his theories
and judgments on life and art. Consequently, the absence of a detailed comparative examination of Joubert and Arnold is surprising;
and to fill, at least partially, this lacuna in the study of Arnold is
the aim of this essay.
Matthew Arnold, wrItmg to his mother on February 4, 1863,
describes the literary work which he hopes to complete before the
coming of summer. His projects are numerous: "I hope before I
come to Fox How (if I come there) this summer, to have printed six
articles" (Letters, I, 242-243). After enumerating them, he mentions
another possible essay, more nebulous at this time: "Perhaps I may
add to these one on Joubert, an exquisite French critic, a friend of
Chateaubriand."
This passage is of considerable interest as Arnold's earliest sur1 A. Whitridge, "Matthew Arnold and Sainte·Beuve," PMLA, LIII
(1938);
L. F. Mott, "Renan and Matthew Arnold," Modem Language Notes, XXXIII
(1918); F. L. Wickelgren, "Matthew Arnold's Literary Relations with France,"
Modem Language Review, XXXIII (1938); V. L. Romer, "Matthew Arnold and
Some French Poets," Nineteenth Century, XCIX (1926); S. M. B. Coulling,
"Renan's Influence on Arnold's Literary and Social Criticism," Florida State University Studies, V (1952).
2 Bonnerot, pp. 280-281; Trilling, pp. 197-201.
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viving comment on Joubert. However, Joubert is far from being a
new interest to him. "My great advantage is that every one of the
subjects I propose to treat is one that I have long reached in my
mind, read and thought much about, and been often tempted to
write of."
How early did Arnold become acquainted with Joubert? This
question can be answered with a considerable degree of exactness.
Joubert's Pensees, Essais, Maximes et Correspondance was not
printed until 1838, and then incompletely and "for private circulation only" (E. in C., 1,298); the first edition for the general public
did not appear until 1842. By 1863 the book had been greatly augmented and twice reprinted, in 1850 and 1861. Arnold possessed
a copy of the 1861 edition, according to the "List of Books" which
the editors of his Note-Books have added to that volume (N.B., 641).
From 1852 until his death in 1888, Arnold kept a reading diary
in his Note-Books. Before 1852 we have only Arnold's letters, and
by no means all of them, to consult for lists of his reading. The lists
there given, however, are extensive, especially in the letters to
Clough, his mother, and his sister Jane ("K."); and Joubert's name
never appears in them.
In the reading diary, the first mention of Joubert's book is
found at the end of the notebook for 1861 (N.B., 566). The correspondence of this date with that of the publication of the third
edition, the fact that Arnold owned a copy of this edition, and the
absence of any earlier mention of Joubert all make it seem fairly
certain that Arnold first read Joubert in this year. The book is referred to simply as "Pensees et Maximes de M. Joubert." The title
is not crossed through, indicating that Arnold did not finish the
book that year, or desired to reread it soon (N.B., xiv). The list for
1862 contains a reference to Joubert in a list of books to be taken
to Fox How in the summer (N.B., 567). In 1863 Joubert's name appears, not in the reading list proper, but in a series of titles marked
"To compose. Prose"; and it is crossed through (N.B., 569). This is
evidently a reference to the essay "Joubert," which appeared in
Essays in Criticism, First Series, in 1865.
We may assume, then, that Arnold's knowledge of Joubert was
reasonably complete and thorough by February of 1863. Let us
consider now his brief comment on Joubert in his letter to his
mother.
"An exquisite critic, a friend of Chateaubriand." It was Chateaubriand who had written the obituary of which Arnold speaks so
highly in "Joubert" (E. in C., I, 298), and who had prepared the
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first, private edition of the Pensees for publication. Whether Arnold's admiration for Chateaubriand led him to Joubert is not now
discoverable, but certainly the discovery that Chateaubriand had
valued Joubert as a friend and an author would have augmented
Arnold's interest in the older writer.s
What Arnold means by the words "an exquisite critic" may best
be explained by his characterization of Joubert in the essay: "a man
of extraordinary ardour in the search for truth, and of extraordinary fineness in the perception of it" (E. in C., I, 306). Joubert is
exquisite in the sense of "discriminating"-the most common use
of the word in connection with critics and criticism; he is also exquisite in the sense of "intense" or "consummate." These types of
exquisiteness are prized highly by Arnold. They are closely related
to the two commandments of Bishop Wilson which Arnold quotes
at the beginning of one of his most famous essays.4 When we "take
care that our light be not darkness," we are discriminating; when we
"never go against the best light," we are intense or ardent. We combine the best of Hellenism with the best of Hebraism; and, as will
be shown, one of the chief reasons for Arnold's high opinion of
Joubert is his belief that Joubert had achieved such a combination.
"Joubert" is as warm an acknowledgment and as sensitive an
appreciation as Arnold ever wrote. In it we can find two principal
trends of thought which may be followed profitably in a study of
the relation of Arnold's work to Joubert's. The first is the emphasis
• Mrs. Sells, in Matthew Arnold and France: the Poet, either overlooks or
deliberately minimizes the importance of Chateaubriand to Arnold, an importance to which "Joubert" bears eloquent testimony. She says, for example, that
the character of Rene, hero of Chateaubriand's novel of that name, has as its
keynote "attitudinizing" (p. 42); and in the next sentence, that in Chateaubriand's writings "sentimentality served for religious conviction and the heart
was pompously invoked to override rational scruples." While many modern
readers would agree with this, the following words from "Joubert" show clearly
that these were scarcely Arnold's opinions.
As to Chateaubriand himself, again, the common English judgment,
which stamps him as a mere shallow rhetorician, all froth and vanity, is
certainly wrong; one may even wonder that we English should judge
Chateaubriand so wrongly, for his power goes far beyond beauty of diction;
it is a power, as well, of passion and sentiment, and this sort of power the
English can perfectly well appreciate. One production of Chateaubriand's,
Rene, is akin to the most popular productions of Byron,-to the Chi Ide
Harold or Manfred,-in spirit, equal to them in power, superior to them
in form.
(E. in C., I, 303)
And later, after quoting Chateaubriand on tragedy: "Who does not feel that
the man who wrote that was no shallow rhetorician, but a born man of genius,
with the true instinct of genius for what is really admirable?"
• "Hebraism and Hellenism"; C. and A., 120.
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Arnold places on Joubert's possession of light-intellectual and
spiritual illumination and clarity-and on the paramount importance of this quality to the critical thinker. He praises Joubert for
"his having clearly seized the fine and just idea that beauty and
light are properties of truth, and that truth is incompletely exhibited if it is exhibited without beauty and light" (E. in C., 1,310).
The second is the classification of Joubert's work by subject matter; what Arnold considers to be his most significant maxims deal
with three topics-religion, literature, and society. Ii
The use of light as a metaphorical equivalent of truth or intelligence has a long history in Western culture. 6 We can trace it back to
Zoroaster and Plato: Ahuramazdah, the god of light, is the principle
of all good according to the Avesta; in the Republic, the light from
the fire of knowledge is the only illumination of the cave of human
existence. We find it in the Bible, most markedly perhaps in II
Corinthians 4:6: "God, who commanded the light to shine out of
darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." Plotinus regarded fire as "splendid beyond all material bodies," and its light
as "the splendour that belongs to the Idea."7 In the Middle Ages
such writers as Bonaventure and Grosseteste carried this thought
further and constructed a "cosmological account of light as the fundamental form and energy of all being, the source and form of all
beauty." The basic analogy of their aesthetic was between "the
beauty of brightness" and "clear knowledge and . . . the clearly
knowable."8
It may be noted that, to the earliest users of the symbol, light
appears to be well-nigh interchangeable with fire, its chief source.
Fire, however, is a source of heat as well as of light; and both fire
and heat became symbols for emotion, rather than reason or knowledge, at a fairly early period. Today we speak commonly of "the
heat of anger," "the warmth of zeal." Jeremiah's God cried out
against Israel Ger. 17:4): "¥e have kindled a fire in mine anger,
• Joubert's religious criticism shows "delicacy and penetration" (E. in C., I,
315); his literary maxims "have the same purged and subtle delicacy" (319);
his political thought is "keen and true" (328).
• This and the following paragraph are based largely upon some brief but
pregnant passages on the symbolism of light in William K. Wimsatt, Jr., and
Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short History (New York, 1957), pp. 120122. 140-141.
• The Enneads, trans. Stephen McKenna (London and Boston. 1917-1930),
1.81.
8

Wimsatt and Brooks.

op. cit., pp.

139. 140.
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that shall burn for ever." Isaiah used fire interestingly, as a symbol
of false or illusory knowledge (Is. 50:11): "All ye that kindle a fire,
that compass yourselves about with sparks: walk in the light of
your fire, and in the sparks that ye have kindled. This shall ye have
of mine hand; ye shall lie down in sorrow." Two quotations from
Shakespeare9 will show a more modern use of fire as a symbol of
emotion in active opposition to reason. The Dowager Countess of
Rossillion in All's Well that Ends Well (V, 3, n. 6-8) speaks of
th' blaze of youth,
When oil and fire, too strong for reason's force,
0' erbears it and burns on.
In The Two Gentlemen of Verona (II, 7, n. 21-23), Lucette seeks
to calm her lovesick mistress, Julia:
I do not seek to quench your love's hot fire,
But qualify the fire's extreme rage,
Lest it should burn above the bounds of reason.
The symbolism of light appears in many of the thoughts of
Joubert and the critical essays of Arnold; to a much lesser extent
they use the symbolism of fire. Bonnerot devotes most of his discussion of their relationship to a comparison of their theories of
light. He goes so far as to say of Arnold: "C'est dans son essai sur
Joubert qu'il a Ie mieux exprime son culte pour la lumiere" (280).
In later chapters I shall discuss more thoroughly the use of the
symbol by the two men. Let it suffice now to say that Arnold recognized and admired in Joubert not only the possession of the quality
but the fondness for the metaphor. 10
Arnold's comparison of Joubert with Coleridge is based primarily on the fact that, in Arnold's judgment, they both had light.
"That in which the essence of their likeness consisted is this,-that
they both had from nature an ardent impulse for seeking the genuine truth on all matters they thought about, and a gift for finding
it and recognizing it when it was found" (E. in C., I, 300). But Coleridge must eventually be considered inferior to Joubert as a critic,
because his light was not concentrated into the "one single ray ...
starting from a single point." His life and his thought were not at
one, and therefore the body of his life was not full of light.
• This and the following citation from Shakespeare are taken from The Complete Works, ed. George Lyman Kittredge (Boston, 1936), pp. 393 and 47
respectively .
•• Arnold quotes in "Joubert," in whole or in part, no fewer than 51 of
Joubert's maxims. Four of the longest and most important of these-on the Bible
and the religious orders (E. in C., I. 317-319). on Plato (322). and two on
thought (311-312) -use the symbolism of light extensively.
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For certainly it is natural that the love of light, which is
already, in some measure, the possession of light, should
irradiate and beautify the whole life of him who has it.
There is something unnatural and shocking where, as in the
case of Coleridge, it does not. Joubert pains us by no such
contradiction.
(E. in C., I, 330-331)
Contradiction always pained Arnold, and consistency always
pleased him. He refused for years to reprint those of his own poems
which conflicted with his critical aims, and he expected in others
the same "single eye" which he so rigorously developed in himself.
That Jdubert, from mere slenderness of achievement, might manifest a greater concentration and consistency than Coleridge, does
not seem to have occurred to Arnold. But the single aim and impression which are certainly to be found in Joubert are admirable
traits in a writer of pensees.
The tripartite classification of Joubert's subject matter is not
less interesting because it is incomplete. Arnold deliberately excludes from his consideration, except in passing, maxims which deal
with subjects other than religion, literature, and society;" and one
feels that this is not only because Arnold thinks the best maxims
deal with these subjects, but because he thinks them the best subjects for maxims to deal with. Joubert had, in fact, many others
which interested him;12 but most of Arnold's intellectual endeavor,
so far as his prose is concerned, was directed into these three
channels.
In the succeeding chapters of this essay, I shall attempt to present some indications of the effect which Joubert's Pensees had upon
Arnold's thought, over and beyond that which is acknowledged in
"Joubert." "Joubert" was written on the strength of two years'
acquaintanceship; but throughout the rest of Arnold's life he referred frequently to Joubert, in his published writings and in his
notebooks. The "one single ray" of illumination which Arnold
steadfastly pursued had rested earlier on Joubert, as it had on men
so different as Isaiah, Marcus Aurelius, Goethe, and Bishop Wilson;
and it was Arnold's habit to make pilgrimages to those places where
he knew the light had shone.
11 Cf. E. in C., I, 329: "I have not cared to exhibit him as a -sayer of brilliant
epigrammatic things ... , though for such sayings he is famous."
10 Among the titles in his two volumes are "Qu'est-ce que la Pudeur?" (VI);
"Des differents Ages, de la Vie, de la Maladie, et de la Mort" (VII); "De l'Espace,
du Temps, de la Lumiere, de I'Air, de I'Atmosphere, des Champs, des Animaux,
des Fleurs, etc." (XIII).

2 / liThe Poetry 0/ the Heart":
Joubert and Arnold's Religious Thought

La religion est la poesie du coeur; elle a des enchantements utiles a nos moeurs; elle nous donne et Ie bonheur et
la vertu.
La verite ne vient pas et ne peut pas venir de nous. Dans
tout ce qui est spirituel, elle vient de Dieu .... II faut donc
consulter Dieu d'abord, puis les sages et son pro pre esprit,
pour tout ce qui est spirituel.
Joseph Joubert, Pensees, I: 60; XI: 4
The language of the Bible ... is literary, not scientific
language; language thrown out at an object of consciousness
not fully grasped, which inspired emotion. Evidently, if the
object be one not fully to be grasped, and one to inspire emotion, the language of figure and feeling will satisfy us better
about it, will cover more of what we seek to express, than the
language of literal fact and science.
Religion, if we follow the intention of human thought
and human language in the use of the word, is ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling.
Matthew Arnold, Literature and Dogma
Few of Arnold's writings-especially of those published after
1860-fail to deal with religious questions. Many do so, of course,
only briefly and indirectly. At least three books, however, were presented by Arnold, and received by the public, as major contributions to nineteenth century religious thought. These are St. Paul
and Protestantism (1870), Literature and Dogma (1873), and God
and the Bible (1875). As the chief expressions of Arnold's religious
views, they constitute the chief sources of the material of this chapter. In addition, the essay "Joubert" will, here as elsewhere, be used
to provide some foundation for discussion; and Arnold's last important poem, "Westminster Abbey" (1882), can furnish several
valuable insights.
8
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Arnold, beginning his critical comment on Joubert's book, cautions his readers: "The first or preliminary chapter has some fancifulness and affectation in it; the reader should begin with the
second" (E. in C., I, 299). The second (numbered as "Titre premiere," the first being "Titre preliminaire") is the chapter entitled
"De Dieu, de la Creation, de I'Eternite, de la Piete, de la Religion,
des Livres saints et des Pretres." From this ambitiously named
chapter come fifteen of the fifty-one pensees quoted by Arnold in
"Joubert"-more than from any other single chapter. They are
prefaced by this judgment on Joubert as a religious thinker:
I doubt whether, in an elaborate work on the philosophy
of religion, he would have got his ideas about religion to
shine, to use his own expression, as they shine when he utters
them in perfect freedom. Penetration in these matters is
valueless without soul, and soul is valueless without penetration; both of these are delicate qualities, and, even in those
who have them, easily lost; the charm of Joubert is, that he
has and keeps both.
(E. in C., 1,312-313)
Soul and penetration are, in this context, approximate equivalents
of sweetness and light respectively. Joubert shows, as Arnold himself was to show later, an appreciation of the triple nature and
power of religion-part intellectual, part moral, part aesthetic and
intuitive; and such appreciation requires sweetness and light. Both
Joubert and Arnold are concerned with distinguishing between and
evaluating the three aspects of religion, a task for which soul and
penetration are needed.
Because they see these aspects of religion as inextricably conjoined, they both distrust metaphysics and metaphysical systems,
which attempt to dissociate the intellectual element of religion
from its fellows and to exalt it above them. Arnold shows this distrust to some extent in the passage quoted above, when he doubts
whether Joubert, had he written "an elaborate work on the philosophy of religion," could have preserved his penetration and his
soul as he has in the Pensees. In the second chapter of God and the
Bible, entitled "The God of Metaphysics," Arnold engages in a
lengthy, semiphilological disquisition designed to prove essentially
that "all abstract ideas are merely the illegitimate inflation of concrete experience" (Trilling, 327), and consequently that metaphysics is "the science of non-naturals" (G and B., 56). In Literature
and Dogma continually, and in the other books frequently, he
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argues for the even greater illegitimacy of that specialized form of
metaphysics known as theology.
A system of theological notions about personality, essence,
existence, consubstantiality, is artificial religion, and is the
proper opposite to revealed; since it is a religion which comes
forth in no man's consciousness, but is invented by theologians,-able men with uncommon talents for abstruse reasoning. This religion is in no sense revealed, just because it is in
no sense natural.
(L. and D., 50-51)
A few pages later, speaking of theological attempts to define God,
he denounces "the astounding particularity and license of affirmation of our dogmatists, as if he [God] were a man in the next street.
... Theologians ... built up a wall first, in order afterwards to
run their own heads against it" (59).
What Arnold dislikes most about metaphysicians and theologians
is, in the former, the use of language which is at the same time both
overspecialized and vague, and in the latter, the attempt to twist the
language of poetry into that of science. joubert's suspicions are
very similar. On the language of metaphysics, Joubert exclaims:
"Combien de gens se font abstraits pour paraitre profonds! La
plupart des termes abstraits sont des ombres qui cachent des vides"
(XII, 32); and "Le Dieu de la metaphysique n'est qU'une idee" (1,9).
On the pseudo science of some theologians: "Oserai-je Ie dire? On
connait Dieu facilement, pourvu qu'on ne se contraigne pas a Ie
definir" (I, 6); and "C'est leur confiance en eux-memes, et la foi
secrete qu'ils ont de leur infaillibilite personnelle, qui deplaisent
dans quelques theologiens" (I, 122). These latter come very close
to Arnold's assertions of "astounding particularity."
When it comes to accusing particular parties of "astounding particularity," both Joubert and Arnold have fairly specific targetstargets, moreover, which resemble each other in several ways. Joubert's target is the Jansenists. The paragraph in which he attacks
them for their misuse of religious language is quoted approvingly
by Arnold.
Les jansenistes font de la grace une espece de quatrieme
personne de la sainte Trinite; ils sont, sans Ie croire et sans
Ie vouloir, quaternitaux. Saint Paul et saint Augustin, trop
etudies, ou etudies uniquement, ont tout perdu, si on ose Ie
dire. Au lieu de grace, dites aide, secours, influence divine,
celeste rosee; on s'entend alors. Ce mot est comme un talisman dont on peut briser Ie prestige et Ie maIefice en Ie tra-
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duisant; on en dissout Ie danger par l'analyse. Personnifier les
mots est un mal funeste en theologie.
(I, 135)
Except for their retention of the Visible Church as the chief
means by which God's grace is dispensed, the Jansenists were what
might be called the Calvinists of French Catholicism. For them the
"habitual grace" of Thomism, for the reception of which the souls
of all men are prepared by virtue of their human condition, had
ceased to exist; the "actual grace" of God, wholly external to the
nature of man, was all. With man made powerless before God, and
God made knowable to man only through the workings of his
grace, "grace" does become a sort of fourth member of the Godhead:
in mediation as important as Christ, in power as great as the Holy
Spirit. And this heresy is brought about, says Joubert, partially
through inattention to, or too much attention to, language. Joubert
was most displeased, of course, by the denigration of morality and
reason which this exaltation of grace brought in its train; but he
disapproves in this paragraph especially the attempt to turn poetic
language into scientific language-"personnifier les mots."
Two other pensees on the Jansenists show how clearly, to Joubert's mind, they had forfeited the essence of religion by their
disproportionate emphasis on only one of its aspects.
Les jansenistes aiment mieux la regIe que Ie bien; les
jesuites preferent Ie bien a la regIe. Les premiers sont plus
essentiellement savants, les seconds plus essentiellement
pieux.
(I, 133)
Les philosophes pardonnent au jansenisme, parce que Ie
jansenisme est une espece de philosophie.
(I, 137)
Joubert attacks Jansenism not merely for intellectuality, but
for false intellectuality-false because, while making a show of intellect with its pseudo-scientific language, it rests on a basis of denial
of the power of human reason. For a similar false intellectuality,
manifested in a like misuse of words, Arnold repeatedly attacks
"the authors of our dogmatic theology" (L. and D., 286): the sacerdotaIists of Catholicism and high Anglicanism, the "justificationists"
of Evangelicalism and Dissent. Joubert said that the word "grace"
was to the J ansenists a talisman. Arnold, writing several decades
later and using the same comparison, takes the dogmatists to task
for making an entire book or a single church a charm.
For, after all, the Bible is not a talisman, to be taken and
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used literally; neither is any existing Church a talisman,
whatever pretensions of the sort it may make, for giving the
right interpretation of the Bible.
(L. and D., xxix-xxx)
Joubert's sentence about the dangers of studying Paul and Augustine too much or in isolation is a partial preface to Arnold's
insistence, found mainly in Literature and Dogma but repeated in
all three books, that a man who knows no book save the Bible cannot possibly know that book well. "The homo unius libri, the man
of no range in his reading, must almost inevitably misunderstand
the Bible" (L. and D., xiii). Now all dogmatists, whether sacerdotalists of the Right or justificationists of the Left, are essentially one·
book men, or at best one-book-plus·commentary men. Yet they,
certain as they are to misunderstand that which they study so exclusively, set themselves up as the only real authorities on religion.
Arnold sums up his case against them severely: "For the learned
science [of religion] one feels no tenderness, because it has gone
wrong with a great parade of exactitude and philosophy" (L. and D.,
305). This decision is by no means overly severe, if one considers
the gravity of the main charge against the dogmatists. This charge
is that they lack culture, "the acquainting ourselves with the best
that has been known and said in the world, and thus with the history
of the human spirit" (L. and D., xii). This deliberate fixity of attention which the man of one book, one work, one idea, gives to
only one part of the world's best and of human experience, removes
him from the full glory of light-from the completeness of the revelation of God in the human spirit.
"L'idee de Dieu est une lumiere, une lumiere qui guide, qui
rejouit," Joubert says (I, 101). Arnold turns from philosophical and
theological systems, built on the sand of undefined and misused
terms, to seek a "verifiable" definition of God, an idea which can
be to the plain man the best light he has. To formulate this definition Arnold has recourse to the Bible, especially to the Old Testament, and to the moral experience of humanity.
In Literature and Dogma, Arnold attempts to state the essential
qualities of the Jewish Eternal, Jehovah, without ascribing to this
Eternal any anthropomorphic trappings. Righteousness and transcendent power are for him the basic attributes of this Eternal.
They [the Jews] meant the Eternal righteous, who loveth
righteousness. They had dwelt upon the thought of conduct
and right and wrong, till the not ourselves which is in us and
all around us, became to them adorable eminently and altogether as a power which makes for righteousness; which
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makes for it unchangeably and eternally, and is therefore
called The Eternal.
(L. and D., 32)
Any attempt to define God, especially a "scientific" attempt
which proclaims its dissatisfaction with practically every other
definition, is capable of exciting opposition. Joubert's warning on
this matter (I, 6), already quoted, was not heeded by Arnold. Joubert himself attempts poetic approximation rather than definition,
as does the Old Testament. Anticipating half of Arnold's definition
almost exactly, he speaks of the true God as a power, and compares
him with the God of metaphysics to the latter's discredit. Mter
saying (I, 9) that the God of metaphysics is only an idea, he adds:
"mais Ie Dieu des religions, Ie Createur du ciel et de la terre, Ie
Juge souverain des actions et des pensees, est une force."
In discussing the relation of Joubert's thought to the other half
of Arnold's definition-righteousness-we must first look at Arnold's
famous definition of religion. In defining religion, Arnold first isolates its object: "the object of religion is conduct" (L. and D., 14).
Conduct becomes righteousness, the true mark of religion, when
emotion is added to it.
Religion, if we follow the intuition of human thought and
human language in the use of the word, is ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling; the passage from morality
to religion is made when to morality is applied emotion. And
the true meaning of religion is this, not simply morality, but
morality touched by emotion.
(L. and D., 20)
Interestingly, Arnold never undertakes to define, in Literature and
Dogma or elsewhere, the "emotion" which when added to morality
produces religion; he does not even name it. Yet it cannot be simply
any emotion; neither Arnold himself nor his sympathetic readers
would be likely to admit that such an emotion as the fear of hellfire, when superimposed on morality, would create true religion. In
Arnold's extended comparison of moral and religious maxims (L.
and D., 22-24), that which separates the two is an emotion which is
specifically religious, and which can only be termed the love of a
transcendent righteous power, or God!
• It might be argued that the first example given by Arnold proves something very different from what Arnold thought it proved, since the quotation
from Quintilian mentions a "power not ourselves which makes for righteousness"
-Providentia; while the quotation from Proverbs has no mention of a transcendent power having any effect on "the path of the just." Arnold tells us that
the former is morality, and the latter religion; but without Arnold's ipse dixit
we might feel justified in coming to the opposite conclusion.
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To Joubert, as to Arnold, conduct and emotion are indispensable
characteristics of true religion and truly religious men. Although he
is no Jansenist, he is a notably Puritan Catholic; Arnold must have
been surprised to discover such a man in France, the land of
l'homme moyen sensuel. One long entry in Joubert's first chapter
shows his conception of the relative worth of virtue and intellect
in the eyes of God.
Dieu mettra-t-il les belles pensees au rang des belles actions? Ceux qui les ont cherchees, qui s'y plaisent et s'y attachent, auront-ils une recompense? Le philosophe et Ie
poIitique seront-ils payes de leurs plans, comme I'homme de
bien sera paye de ses bonnes oeuvres? Et les travaux utiles
ont-ils un merite, aux yeux de Dieu, comme les bonnes
moeurs? Peut-etre bien; mais Ie premier prix n'est pas assure
comme Ie second, et ne sera pas Ie meme.

(1,28)
If this does not have the mathematical precision of Arnold's estimate of conduct as "three-fourths of life" (L. and D., 18), it certainly
gives to conduct a definite if not overwhelming pre-eminence.
Arnold's vagueness in dealing with the religious emotion does
not beset Joubert. Joubert is not afraid of the word piety, as Arnold
seems to be; indeed, one of the most singular characteristics of Arnold's religious writings is the complete absence of this word from
their pages. 2 In a passage which Arnold quotes with approbation
in "Joubert," Joubert tries to define the relationship of piety to
religion.
La piete n'est pas une religion, quoiqu'elle soit Lime de
toutes. On n'a pas une religion, quand on a seulement de
pieuses inclinations, comme on n'a pas de patrie, quand on a
seulement de la philanthropie. On n'a une patrie, et 1'0n n'est
citoyen d'un pays, que lorsqu'on se decide it observer et it defendre certaines lois, a obeir it certains magistrats, et it
adopter certaines manieres d'etre et d'agir.
(1,61 )
Piety is not enough, as reason and morality alone are not enough,
to constitute true religion; but as an attitude of the soul, piety aids
• The word pietism, which originally denominated a movement in the Lutheran Church in Germany, acquired in the nineteenth century its pejorative
meaning as an exaggerated religious attitude. (The OED records this usage first
for 1829.) Arnold certainly would have disliked this attitude, and perhaps his
dislike extended to the parent word. Yet in 1875, the year of God and the Bible,
Henry Edward, Cardinal Manning defined piety as almost the equivalent of
Arnold's religious "emotion": "Piety is the filial affection of the sons of God"
(The Mission of the Holy Ghost, p. 295) .
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reason and morality to know and do the will of God. "On connait
Dieu par la piete, seule modification de notre ame par laquelle il
soit mis a notre portee et puisse se montrer a nous" (I, 3). Compared
with this, the reason Arnold gives for the religious superiority of
the Jews is significant: "No people ever felt so strongly as ... the
Hebrew people, that conduct is three-fourths of our life and its
largest concern" (L. and D., 26). That is, the Hebrews' religious emotion-their piety-brought the knowledge of the transcendent righteous power to their door, and helped them to act according to its
dictates.
Joubert sums up for piety (I, 34): "La piete est une sagesse
sublime, qui surpasse toutes les autres, une espece de genie, qui
donne des ailes a l'esprit." Arnold's final phrasing of Israel's achievement is:

He that hath the bride is the bridegroom; the idea belongs
to him who has most loved it . ... Israel and the Bible are
filled with righteous joy, and rise higher and say: 'Righteousness is salvation!' and this is what is inspiring.
(L. and D., 362, 363)

"The idea belongs to him who has most loved it." Love of the
righteous power-piety-gives man the knowledge of this power's
nature. "the idea" of God and of conduct. Consequently it leads
to a right use of reason and a right standard of conduct. and so is
truly "une sagesse sublime." By fostering both light and sweetness,
it has its important function in creating "the poetry of the heart."
A common adjunct of poetry is imagery. The imagery of light.
discussed briefly and generally in the first chapter of this essay, has
a considerable place in the attempts of Arnold and Joubert to depict
religion and to analyze its power. Since this imagery is so important
a part of scriptural authors' efforts toward the same end, this is not
surprising.
Arnold begins his approach to a definition of God with etymology. In Literature and Dogma he takes our word for the Deity back
to its earliest significance.
Strictly and formally the word "God." we now learn from
the philologist. means. like its kindred Aryan words. Theos,
Deus, and Deva, simply shining or brilliant . ... [It] is a reminiscence of those times. when men invoked "The Brilliant on
high" . . . as the power representing to them that which
transcended the limits of their narrow selves. and that by
which they lived and moved and had their being.

(L. and D., 12. 29-30)
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In God and the Bible "the Shining" is used (30-32) as a minimal
etymological definition of God. Here, Arnold says, is the beginning
of the concept of God; "Let there be light" is the first step in religious psychology, if not perhaps in cosmology.
Joubert introduces light into his first chapter almost at the outset, but with an interestingly different emphasis.
Dans cette operation d'imaginer Dieu, Ie premier moyen
est la figure humaine, Ie dernier terme la lumiere, et, dans la
lumiere, la splendeur.
(1,2)
Light is here the last achievement of religious meditation ("dans
cette operation . . . Ie dernier terme") rather than the primary,
irreducible insight. s For Arnold, of course, light represents a final
achievement, which culture helps to bring about; but this achievement is only an amplification of the primitive recognition of "the
Shining." 1£ the light of Arnold's God has its source in Genesis 1:3,
the light of Joubert'S God is the summation of Dante's quest: "Cio
ch'io dico e un semplice lume."4
This light which has its origin in God, and more particularly
in the mind of God, is transmitted to, and through, the minds of
men, according to Joubert. "Dieu multiplie l'intelligence, qui se
communique comme Ie feu, a l'infini. Allumez mille flambeaux a
un flambeau, sa flamme demeure toujours la meme" (I, 15). This
transmission of illumination-and we may note, in this pensee, that
the source of light (the torch) is also a source of heat-is incomprehensible to man save by introspection. "Dieu nous parle tout bas
et nous illumine en secret. II faut, pour l'entendre, du silence interieur; il faut, pour apercevoir sa lumiere, fermer nos sens et ne
regarder que dans nous" (I, 17). Elsewhere Joubert says, "Dieu
eclaire ceux qui pensent souvent a lui, et qui levent les yeux vers
lui" (I, 100).
All these pensees express ideas which Arnold considered essential
to the "better apprehension" of God and Christianity which he
sought to bring about. The first presents, metaphorically, the same
God whom Arnold shows as a power capable of fusing the intellectual, intuitive, and emotive strains in the mind which contemplates
him. Arnold's definition of religion stipulates that emotion both
lights up morality and enkindles it; the love of God gives both
• Cf. also I, 90: "Pour arriver aux regions de la lumiere, il faut passer par
les nuages. Les uns s'arretent Iii; d'autres savent passer outre."
• Paradiso, ed. C. H. Grandgent (Boston, 1933) , XXXIII, 90.
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warmth and light to our thought and our conduct. What the love
of God does for Arnold, God himself does for Joubert, who was less
anxious to eschew Aberglaube. As the torch illumines other torches,
other representations of light and warmth, so the idea of God creates in the thought of men a union of intelligence and feeling.
The thesis of the second pensee-"Dieu nous illumine en secret"
-is basically an embroidering of the injunction of Jesus (Matt. 6:6):
"When thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast
shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy
Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly." Arnold emphasizes in his theory of religion the necessity of an action similar
in nature and result to the "closing of our senses" which Joubert
advocates. He calls it "the annulment of our ordinary self" (Paul,
xxx), which brings about the "grace and peace" which are "the essence of religion" (Last E., 377). Arnold always considered the senses
as the dominant force in the ordinary self, and regarded the control
of their clamorings as one of the chief duties of the moral man.
When M. Littre . . . traces up, better, perhaps, than any
one else, all our impulses into two elementary instincts, the
instinct of self-preservation and the reproductive instinct,then we take his theory and we say. that all the impulses
which can be conceived as derivable from the instinct of selfpreservation in us and the reproductive instinct ... are the
matter of conduct . ... How we deal with these impulses is
the matter of conduct,-how we obey, regulate, or restrain
them; that, and nothing else.
(L. and D., 16-17)
One of the most interesting-and perhaps, to the modem reader,
amusing-passages in Literature and Dogma occurs in the eleventh
chapter, "The True Greatness of the Old Testament," where Arnold indulges in a lengthy exposition of the French doctrine of
I' homme moyen sensuel. The French develop the ordinary or apparent self more tactfully, more sensibly than any other people;
but it remains a self which ought not to be developed.
And why? Because the free development of our senses all
round, of our apparent self, has to undergo a profound modification from the law of our higher real self, the law of righteousness; because he, whose ideal is the free development of
the senses all round, serves the senses, is a servant. But: The
servant abideth not in the house for ever; the son abideth for
ever.
(L. and D., 361)
To Arnold, as I have said before, Joubert must have seemed very
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un-French on this point. Joubert quotes fondly a friend's remark
that he seemed a spirit who had happened upon a body (Prel., p.
90); and a perusal of the Pensees shows clearly that his spirituality
and denial of the claims of the senses are uncompromising-some
might say, almost to the point of prudishness. II
Arnold's capsule formula for "i! faut . . . fermer nos sens" is
stated in St. Paul and Protestantism (71): "To die with Christ to
the law of the flesh, to live with Christ to the law of the mind." He
regards this, with considerable insight, as "Paul's central doctrine,"
and emphasizes it proportionately. Joubert's final epigrammatic
statement of his position is "Ferme les yeux, et tu verras" (I, 89).
In I, 1I3, Joubert writes: "Chaque jour i1 faut prier [a Dieu],
attacher sa pen see sur cette lumiere qui epure." This statement,
coupled with "Dieu eclaire ceux qui pensent souvent a lui," and
translated, as Arnold would say, from metaphor into science, becomes something very close to Arnold's definition of prayer.
All good and beneficial prayer is in truth, however men
may describe it, at bottom nothing else than an energy of
aspiration towards the eternal not ourselves that makes for
righteousness,-of aspiration towards it, and of cooperation
with it.
(L.:and D., 43, fn. 1)
In this definition, prayer appears as both thought and action; the
"energy of aspiration," beginning in the mind, translates itself into
the kinetic energy of "co-operation." Joubert seems to give greater
emphasis to the potential energy of prayer, to consider it as purely
a mental and spiritual activity. This impression is heightened if we
consider such aphorisms as "Le ciel est pour ceux qui y pensent"
(I, 33) and "Penser a Dieu est une action" (I, 46). These two pensees
seem to indicate an attitude, on Joubert's part, which Arnold would
have considered well-nigh pure Hellenism; they are certainly, taken
in isolation, examples of a more extreme Hellenism than "C'est Ie
bonheur des hommes quand ils pensent juste," the remark of an
unidentified Frenchman which Arnold quotes in Culture and Anarchy (123). But we must not forget that Joubert values right action
more than right thought, in the last analysis, as a previously quoted
passage (p. 14, supra) shows. What both men would agree on is the
necessity of right thought as a prerequisite for righteous action, and
the inadequacy of right thought without the subsequent right
action.
• An entire chapter is given over to a definition of modesty (VI, "Qu'est-ce
que ]a Pudeur?").
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Arnold's great difficulty in his religious writings appears most
clearly in a book which is not really one of them, in the Preface to
Culture and Anarchy. At bottom, he is a Hebraist; all his spiritual
energies, left to themselves, would be ranged on the side of conduct,
of that right action which is three-fourths of life. But his intelligence reminds him that, great as doing is, England needs thinking,
the clearsightedness which Hellenism gives. Consequently he can
affirm that "our race will, as long as the world lasts, return to
Hebraism" (C. and A., xlvii), while at the same time asserting the
need for Hellenism: "Now, and for us, it is a time to Hellenise,
and to praise knowing; for we have Hebraised too much, and have
over-valued doing" (xlv). To return to Hebraism one must first
have gone away from it; and England in his day needed to go away
from Hebraism, which had showed her how to walk by her best
light, to Hellenism, to get the best light to walk by. When Hebraism
and Hellenism are well blended, a right religion will be among the
results.
To walk staunchly by the best light one has, to be strict
and sincere with oneself, not to be of the number of those
who say and do not, to be in earnest,-this is the discipline by
which alone man is enabled to rescue his life from thraldom
to the passing moment and to the bodily senses, to ennoble
it, and to make it eternal.
(C. and A., xlvi)
This "discipline" is true religion. One of Joubert's paragraphs (I,
49) anticipates this sentence in almost every point-in emphasizing
light and action, in recognizing the power of emotion, and in expressing distrust of the senses.
Nous sommes eclaires parce que Dieu luit sur nous, et
nous sommes droits parce qu'il nous touche. Dieu nous edaire
comme lumihe; il nous redresse comme regIe. Cette regIe,
non discernee, mais sentie, sert de point de comparaison a nos
jugements dans tout ce qui doit etre estime par une autre
voie que celle des sens.
Finally, one of Arnold's poems, containing extensive hints of
his religious thought and making important use of the imagery Qf
light, is worthy of notice here. It is his last important poem, "Westminster Abbey," written on the occasion of the death of Arthur
Penrhyn Stanley, Dean of Westminster.
Stanley was a progressive Anglican, one of the founders of the
movement which today is termed Broad Church. As the poem makes
abundantly dear, he was a close approach to Arnold's ideal priest,
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as he was to the ideal of Arnold's father. Trilling characterizes Stanley as "liberal, humane, effecting that synthesis of piety and intelligence that Thomas Arnold so desired" (68).
When Arnold entitled the poem "Westminster Abbey" and built
it around the legend of St. Peter's consecration of the edifice, he
was probably not thinking merely of the fact that Stanley was being
buried there, or even of the fact that he had been Dean of the Abbey
at the time of his death. Rather, he must have reflected that in no
other position Stanley had held, not even during his professorship
at Oxford, had he exercised so great a liberalizing influence on the
Church. How well Stanley expressed the ideal of a national clergyman in a national church, and how earnestly Stanley tried to make
of the Church what Arnold thought it should be-"a great national
society for the promotion of what is commonly called goodness ...
through the means of the Christian religion and of the Bible" (Last
E., 345)-is shown in the account of his life in the Dictionary of
National Biography.
In Westminster Abbey he found the material embodiment
of his ideal of a comprehensive national church. . . . It was
one of the objects of his life to open the abbey pulpit to
churchmen of every shade of opinion, to give to laymen and
ministers of other communions opportunities of speaking
within its walls ....
As a preacher he pursued the same objects.... He insisted
that the essence of Christianity lay not in doctrine, but in a
Christian character. He tried to penetrate to the moral and
spiritual substance, which gave vitality to forms, institutions,
and dogmas, and underlay different and apparently hostile
views of religion. On the bed-rock, as it were, of Christianity
he founded his teaching, because here he found the common
ground on which Anglican, Roman catholic, presbyterian,
and non-conformist might meet. 6
In the poem Stanley is celebrated as the second Peter of Westminster. As St. Peter is said to have consecrated the Abbey with
supernatural light, so Stanley hallowed it with his own intellectual
and spiritual light, perhaps less miraculous but not therefore less
valuable. Arnold's catalogue of Stanley'S luminous qualities is itself
enlightening.
It seem'd, a child of light did bring the dower
Foreshown thee in thy consecration-hour,
• R. E. Prothero. Lord ErnIe, in DNB s. v. "Stanley. Arthur PeDrhyn."
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And in thy courts his shining freight unroll'd:
Bright wits, and instincts sure,
And goodness wann, and truth without alloy,
And temper sweet, and love of all things pure,
And joy in light, and power to spread the joy.
(11. 74-80)1
Sweetness, joy, intelligence, truth, purity, and goodness are the important components of Stanley's light. The list is noteworthy because, while the elements of light which may be thought of as purely
human in origin or nature ("wits," "instincts sure," "temper sweet,"
"love of all things pure," "joy in light, and power to spread the
joy") are in the majority, there are also elements ("goodness warm,"
"truth without alloy") which, in Arnold's scheme, originate outside
the nature of man. Arnold insists that man did not create morality
(G. and B., 142); his minimal definition of God he defends because
it "can be verified" (L. and D., 322), because it is true, and since it
exists outside ourselves we do not create truth. It is important to
realize this, since a careful reading of the catalogue casts some doubt
on a distinction which Bonnerot attempts to make between the
attitudes of Joubert and Arnold toward light.
Alors que Joubert est convainc;:u que toute lumiere vient de
Dieu, Arnold se persuade qu'il possede sa propre lumiere et
que de bonheur consiste a "vivre dans la lumiere de son arne."
La lumiere n'est done pas pour lui une illumination, un mystere, mais seulement Ie tenne symbolique, moral et intellectuel plutot que spirituel, representant les deux tendances
maitresses de l'homme, la sincerite de la Conscience d'une
part, et, d'autre part, la Curiosite, l'elan de l'Intelligence.
(281)
It is certainly true that Joubert thinks of man as being far more

dependent on God than Arnold would allow-not only for light,
but for all things. It is true also that Joubert regards God as Person,
and Arnold does not; and light emanating from a Divine Person
will to many people seem more "spiritual," more of an "illumination," than light whose source is a vaguely defined transcendent
power for which men search with "an energy of aspiration." But
to say that light is for Arnold no more than a "symbolic term, moral
and intellectual rather than spiritual" is to miss some of the complexity of Arnold's attitude toward religion. Had Stanley'S light
consisted only of Conscience, Curiosity, and Intelligence, Arnold
would scarcely have drawn a parallel between Stanley'S career and
• The complete text of the poem is found in Poems, II, 297·304.
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the truly exalted legend of the consecration of the Abbey. Had
Stanley cre;:tted his own light out of his own soul, Arnold would not
have referred to him as "Bringer of heavenly light" (1. 120); nor
would he have used the other extended comparison in the poem,
that of Stanley and DemophoOn, "The charm'd babe of the Eleusinian king" (1. 85). DemophoOn played unharmed among the flames,
not because of any grace inherent in his nature, but because he was
favored by a power not himself: "His nurse, the Mighty Mother,
will'd it so" (1. 86).
The poem is remarkable, not only for the high value it sets
on light and the skilful use of light as a symbol, but for the noble
passage which asserts the final triumph of light. Culture, Arnold
said in prose, has a passion yet greater than its love for sweetness
and light, which is "the passion for making them prevail" (C. and
A., 40). In this, his last great poem, Arnold transforms the passion
of desire into the purer passion of vision, and tells us that light wili
prevail.
And thou, 0 Abbey grey!
Predestined to the ray
By this dear guest over thy precinct shedFear not but that thy light once more shall burn,
Once more thy immemorial gleam return,
Though sunk be now this bright, this gracious head!
(II. 171-176)
With equal assurance Joubert had said, "Dieu ne fait rien que pour
l'eternite" (I, 16). Light will and must triumph, because the power
not ourselves is ceaselessly working for the augmentation of light.
(Note the fact that the Abbey is "predestined" to receive Stanley'S
light. No writer on Arnold seems to have remarked this curious use,
for a quite serious purpose, of an example of Aberglaube which one
might not have thought particularly congenial to his mind.) And
the power works to spread light, Joubert would have added, because
it (or he) is light. "n en est la lumiere et Ie soleil: c'est lui qui illumine tout: In lumine tuo videbimus lumen" (I, 53).
The imagery of light, used primarily to symbolize the intellectual and intuitive aspects of religion, has then a prominent place
in the religious writings of Arnold and Joubert. Both use light as
a symbol of a spiritual illumination whose source is outside the
mind of man. This is one of their chief similarities. In many instances where Joubert uses the imagery of light to decorate a religious idea-Joubert being concerned, far more than Arnold, with
epigrammatic condensation and verbal adornment of his thought-
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Arnold will be found to express a very similar idea, though devoid
of the embroidery.
But there is more to religion than mental illumination; and Arnold and Joubert regard two other facets of religion with quite
similar attitudes. There is conduct-the righteousness to which
Arnold says religion must "bind" us (L. and D., 20), and which made
of Joubert's religion "une loi, un joug, un indissoluble engagement"
(I, 62). And there is emotion-the piety which for Joubert is the
soul of all religions, and which creates "the poetry of the heart";
the undefined but powerful emotion which lights up Arnold's morality as it did that of Israel, and which gave Israel "poetry and
eloquence" (L. and D., 39), which were worth far more than the
attainments of metaphysically minded Aryans like the Bishops of
Gloucester and Winchester. For Arnold and Joubert, these threeintelligence, conduct, emotion-are a trinity of religious powers.
They are perhaps not equal in importance; but their natures are
distinct, and their end and aim the same.

3 / "The Light 0/ Each Man's Lamp":
Joubert and Arnold's Criticism 0/ Society

La multitude aime la multitude, ou la pluralite dans Ie
glt)Uvernement; les sages y aiment l'unite.

Deplorables epoques que celles ou chaque homme pese tout
a son propre poids, et marche, comme dit la Bible, a la lumiere de sa lampe!
Joseph Joubert, Pensees, XIV: 3, XVIII: 5
When I began to speak of culture, I insisted on our bondage to machinery, on our proneness to value machinery as an
end in itself, without looking beyond it to the end for which
alone, in truth, it is valuable.
We habitually live in our ordinary selves, which do not carry
us beyond the ideas and wishes of the class to which we happen to belong.... But by our best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony. We are in no peril from giving authority
to this, because it is the truest friend we all of us can have;
and when anarchy is a danger to us, to this authority we may
turn with sure trust.
Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy
Joubert and Arnold lived in, and wrote about, epochs which
were primarily periods of political and social upheaval. While Joubert was writing his Pensees, France was experiencing successively
the First Empire, the fall of Napoleon, and the restoration of the
Bourbons. This last event was accompanied by an atmosphere of
reaction against Republic and Empire alike. In the period 18141824, the aristocrats of the south of France fomented the "White
Terror" and organized the Society of the Congregation of the
Blessed Virgin, reactionary movements in state and church respectively. During the last three of these years of Joubert's life, the
so-called "ultra-royalists" were in control of the government, and
extremely restrictive laws were passed to regulate elections and the
24
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press and to increase the political power of the Church. The Revolution of 1830 was eventually to demonstrate that the people as a
whole were not willing to renounce the guarantees of public and
private liberty which the Republic and the Empire had first presented to them; but at the time of Joubert's death the powers of
the Right had France in a fierce if not firm grip.'
The years of Arnold's greatest social and political interest (18641882) were years marked by a different kind of upheaval in England,
a quieter upheaval, and one whose driving force was liberalism,
not reaction. Education and the franchise were being gradually
made available by legislation to larger and larger numbers of the
English people. Power was passing from the hands of landowning
Churchmen to those of manufacturing and shopkeeping Dissenters.
The fact that these changes were accomplished by legislative action
did not mean, however, that they took place without opposition,
opposition which at times took the form of physical violence. The
years 1866-1870 saw some of the most violent political agitation to
affect England since the Reform Bill of 1832; Culture and Anarchy
and Friendships' Garland, Arnold's best-known works of social criticism, appeared during these years marked by crisis and conflict.
(Culture and Anarchy was published in 1869; Friendship's Garland
appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette during 1866, and in book form
in 1871.) Briefly, this four-year period was marked by the failure of a
moderate electoral Reform Bill in March, 1866; the Hyde Park
riots, perpetrated by disgruntled members of the lower classes in
July of that year; the passage (by a Conservative Parliament) of a
far more radical and sweeping Reform Bill in 1867; Fenian disorders
in Chester, Manchester, and London, and left-wing Protestant riots
in Birmingham, also in 1867; and the disestablishment of the Irish
Church (by a violently Liberal Parliament) in 1869. It was a time
when to the moderate, reflective Englishman the anarchy of Arnold's
title seemed an imminent danger.
To phrase the common response of Joubert and Arnold to their
respective times negatively and with reference to Arnold's own
dichotomy is easy: both are against anarchy. What is anarchy? The
answers which both give are descriptive of personal behavior rather
than social. For Joubert, it is the condition described in one of the
epigraphs to this chapter: "chaque homme pese tout a son propre

1

A thorough discussion of these years may be found in John B. Wolf,

France: 1815 to the Present (New York, 1940), ch. 2, "The Reaction Versus the
Revolution."
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poids, et marche, comme dit la Bible, a la lumiere de sa lampe."
For Arnold, it can be phrased simply in the words of a chapter title
from Culture and Anarchy: "Doing as One Likes."
Anarchy exists first, then, and in its simplest form, in the minds
and actions of individuals; if it is dominant in the minds and actions of a sufficient number of individuals, it makes its presence felt
in society. The dominance of anarchy in the minds and actions of
individuals is secured by a false and exaggerated notion of personal
liberty. In his essay "Joubert," Arnold quotes five of Joubert's
political pensees, and four of them have to do with liberty. Three
will be particularly relevant here.
Demandez des ames libres, bien plutot que des hommes
libres. La liberte morale est la seule importante, la seule
necessaire; l'autre n'est bonne et utile qU'autant qu'elle favorise celle-Ia.
(XV, 5)
La subordination est plus belle que l'independance. L'une
est l'ordre et l'arrangement; l'autre n'est que la suffisance unie
a l'isolement.... L'une est l'accord, l'autre Ie ton; l'une est
la part, l'autre l'ensemble.
(XV, 14)
Liberte! libertel En to utes choses justice, et ce sera assez
de liberte.
(XV, 15)2
To these may be added a neighboring aphorism which, although
not quoted by Arnold, states even more clearly than these the idea
of true liberty which was Joubert's, and which with little modification became Arnold's.
La liberte publique ne peut s'etablir que par Ie sacrifice
des libertes privees. Dans cette admirable institution, il faut
que les forts cedent une partie de leurs forces, et les faibles
une partie de leurs esperances. . . . Vne liberte diminuee,
communiquee et repandue, vaut mieux que celIe qui est entiere et concentree.
(XV, 13)
When Joubert speaks of "liberte" without modification or qualification, then, he is speaking of something which he believes to be
bad or at least unsatisfactory, to the individual and to society. It is
better for the individual to be morally free, and for society to have
a public liberty of which subordination is an essential part, than for
• Cf. E. in C., I, 300, for Arnold's English versions.
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society to be made up of individuals each with an idiosyncratic
lamp to walk by.
Arnold, too, dislikes the multitude of lamps, and is fairly sure
that few of them emit any real light. He declares, in Culture and
Anarchy (46-47), his design of showing that "random and ill-regulated action,-action with insufficient light, action pursued because
we like to be doing something and doing it as we please, and do
not like the trouble of thinking and the severe constraint of any
kind of rule" is "a practical mischief and dangerous to us." It is
dangerous because it is the use of personal liberty for its own sake,
with little or no reference to the social desirability of one's actions.
This is the worship of machinery.
In our common notions and talk about freedom, we eminently show our idolatory of machinery. Our prevalent notion is ... that it is a most happy and important thing for a
man merely to be able to do as he likes. On what he is to do
when he is thus free to do as he likes, we do not lay so much
stress.
The worship of machinery, the paying of homage to means and the
ignoring of ends, is the bane of every class in England-Barbarians,
Philistines, and Populace alike; and not least of "Our Liberal Practitioners," with whom the last chapter of Culture and Anarchy is
concerned. These men advocate the disestablishment of the Irish
Church, the Real Estate Intestacy Bill, and the "bill for enabling
a man to marry his deceased wife's sister" (C. and A., 188) as desiderata whose attainment will add to the happiness of mankind by
increasing the liberty of Englishmen to do as they like. What is
wrong with these projects is that they are attempted "in a mechanical way, without reference to any firm intelligible law of things,
to human life as a whole" (C. and A., 194-195).
To such an extent is the worship of machinery carried that it
becomes a kind of slavery, Arnold avers. His ideal citizen, like
Joubert's, is the man who is mentally and morally free; and mental
and moral freedom, unlike the power to do as one likes, is acquired
by culture.
The statement and amplification of Arnold's definition of culture take up many pages of Culture and Anarchy, as indeed is
proper, when we recall that it is from culture that the only effective
check to anarchy can come. Culture is, basically, "a study of perfection" (C. and A., 7); and its constant concern with perfection, both
achieved and potential, is what makes it so necessary for a society
which worships machinery.

28

/

A Fugitive and Gracious Light

What distinguishes culture is, that it is possessed by the scientific passion as well as by the passion of doing good; that it
demands worthy notions of reason and the will of God, and
does not readily suffer its own crude conceptions to substitute
themselves for them. And knowing that no action or institution can be salutary and stable which is not based on reason
and the will of God, it is not so bent on acting and instituting, even with the great aim of diminishing human error and
misery ever before its thoughts, but that it can remember
that acting and instituting are of little use, unless we know
how and what we ought to act and institute ....
Now, if culture, which simply means trying to perfect oneself, and one's mind as part of oneself, brings us light, and if
light shows us that there is nothing so very blessed in merely
doing as one likes, that the worship of the mere freedom to
do as one likes is worship of machinery, that the really blessed
thing is to like what right reason ordains, and to follow her
authority, then we have got a practical benefit out of culture.
We have got a much wanted principle, a principle of authority, to counteract the tendency to anarchy which seems to be
threatening us.
(C. and A., 7; 57-58)
Arnold wants to substitute a society directed by "right reason" for
a group of individuals directed by a love of their own liberty. The
"right reason" of Arnold's ideal society is similar to the "justice"
of Joubert. It is derived ultimately (by way of a long Western
tradition including Aquinas and Milton) from the idea of intellect
combined with principle as the best guide for a man's life, which
is one of the chief subjects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and
is expanded in his Politics to cover the life of man in society. To
Joubert "justice" is far more than a primarily legal regulation of
human relationships; he has even less love for machinery than
Arnold, and his "justice" is Plato's, "the effect of harmony and
order in the soul."3 Certainly the source of his "justice" is as exalted
as that of Arnold's "right reason." "Les droits du peuple ne viennent
pas de lui, mais de la justice. La justice vient de l'ordre, et l'ordre
vient de Dieu lui-meme" (XV, I). With this sort of justice manifested in society, there will indeed be no likelihood of the exaltation
of "doing as one likes" as a principle of action.
This justice, like Arnold's culture, is first and essentially an
inward thing; individuals must manifest it in their own dealings
before it can be made the characteristic of an entire state. Those in• Plato, "Gorgias," in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New
York, 1871), V,95.
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dividuals who manifest justice have true liberty and do not need
formal, or mechanical, liberty. "Que gagnent a la liberte les sages
et les gens de bien, ceux qui vivent sous l'empire de la raison, et
sont esclaves du devoir?" (XV, 12)
As to the way of acquiring this justice, this right reason, for an
entire society, Arnold finds it in "the idea of the whole community,
the State" (C. and A., 94). The true idea of the State, existing in the
minds and informing the actions of its citizens, is culture's highest
political form. Opposed to it are the myriads of "ordinary selves,"
individuals glorying in their personal liberty, and the amplified
"ordinary selves" which are the social classes of Arnold's England.
(Arnold might well have borrowed from his language of religious
controversy and called these "magnified and non-natural ordinary
selves.")
The emphasis placed in Culture and Anarchy on the baneful
effects of too great an attention to class in society is great and
worthy of notice. It is there chiefly as an answer to such rival
prophets as Carlyle, Robert Lowe, and Frederic Harrison-apostles
of the aristocracy, the middle class, and the working class respectively. The chapter "Barbarians, Philistines, Populace" is concerned
with far more than assigning to those classes the apt and amusing
epithets which form the title. Its purpose is to show that no
one class, even in the persons of its best and most capable representatives, is fit to govern England, because so long as class is a criterion
of ability to the English political mind, the "best self" of the English
people will not be developed.
This concept of the State as the embodiment of a people's "best
self' is not presented, it is important to note, as Arnold's idea of the
end of political endeavor. The end of political endeavor is "a harmonious perfection, developing all sides of our humanity; and ...
a general perfection, developing all parts of our society" (C. and A.,
xiv). No one can reasonably assume that such an end will be
achieved the moment a good State begins to function. The good
State is designed to lead those of its members who have not yet
perceived the rightness of this end, and there will be many such,
toward it. Here is another indication of the basically Aristotelian
cast of Arnold's political thought. 4

• Cf. the Politics, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford, 1921), bk. VII, ch. 1:
"Each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and
of good and wise action"; and ch. 2: "That form of government is best in which
every man, whoever he is, can act for the best and live happily."
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That the State must be created in the image of an English "best
self" which is perceived and embodied by men who are governed
by right reason, shows Arnold's idealism; that this State must in its
turn aid in the creation of an individual "best self" in each man
who is not so governed, shows his practicality. Arnold knows very
well that the power which the men of right reason have is that of
their example, not that of numbers; he does not hope that they
will be, in any foreseeable future, a nose-count majority.
In each class there are born a certain number of natures with
a curiosity about their best self, with a bent for seeing things
as they are, for disentangling themselves from machinery, for
simply concerning themselves with reason and the will of
God, and doing their best to make these prevail;-for the pursuit, in a word, of perfection.... They have, in general, a
rough time of it in their lives; but they are sown more abundantly than one might think, they appear where and when
one least expects it, they set up a fire which enfilades, so to
speak, the class with which they are ranked; and, in general,
by the extrication of their best self as the self to develop, and
by the simplicity of the ends fixed by them as paramount,
they hinder the unchecked predominance of that class-life
which is the affirmation of our ordinary self, and seasonably
disconcert mankind in their worship of machinery.
(C. and A., 92, 93)
These two groups of men, the men of right reason and the men
who follow their ordinary selves, are named in "Numbers," one of
the Discourses in America, as "the remnant" and "the majority"
respectively; and they correspond quite exactly to the two groups
in a Joubert pensee at the head of this chapter (XIV, 3). Arnold's
"majority" is Joubert'S "multitude," those who love "plurality in
government"; Arnold's "remnant" is equal to Joubert's "wise men,"
who love unity. The opposition of unity and plurality in Joubert
is a prefiguring of the opposition of "best self" and "ordinary selves"
in Arnold.
Arnold makes his position on the function of the State clearest,
perhaps, when he quotes other men. He calls Renan "one of the
staunchest ... friends of human perfection" (C. and A., 127), and
quotes him, adding italics, on the action of the State: "A Liberal
believes in liberty, and liberty signifies the non-intervention of the
State. But such an ideal is still a long way off from us, and the very
means to remove it to an indefinite distance would be precisely the
State's withdrawing its action too soon."
But it is when he quotes Joubert that Arnold's gradualist attitude receives its best elucidation. In "The Function of Criticism at
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the Present Time" he quotes XV, 2: "C'est la force et Ie droit qui
reglent toutes choses dans Ie monde; la force, en attendant Ie droit."
He goes on to translate the aphorism, rather freely, and to explain
what he believes should be the relation of force (the State) to right
(right reason).
(Force and right are the governors of this world; force till
right is ready.) Force till right is ready; and till right is ready,
force, the existing order of things, is justified, is the legitimate
ruler. But right is something moral, and implies inward recognition, free assent of the will; we are not ready for right,right, so far as we are concerned, is not ready,-until we have
attained this sense of seeing it and willing it. The way in
which for us it may change and transform force, the existing
order of things, and become, in its turn, the legitimate ruler
of the world, should depend on the way in which, when our
time comes, we see it and will it.
(E. in C., 1,12-13)
Right reason informs political power and gradually transforms it,
and its subjects along with it, until the millennial day is reached
when reason is the only power, directing all the actions of all men.
Even in the perfect society, however, the chief blessing is not
liberty from political power, but order without political machinery.
In his high valuation of order in society, too, Arnold is at one with
Joubert. Joubert begins his chapter "De l'Education" with the statement (XIX, 1): "L'idee de l'ordre en toutes choses, c'est-a-dire de
l'ordre litteraire, moral, politique et religieux, est la base de toute
education."1i It is one of the bases of Arnold's culture also, for without it culture could scarcely oppose anarchy successfully; it is the
"firm intelligible law of things" already referred to.
That order is better than liberty-or, in Joubert's terms, that
subordination is better than independence-appears in Arnold's
criticism of Mr. Chambers' bill (C. and A., 180-184). When he discusses this proposed act, whose end is to legalize the marriage of
one's deceased wife's sister, he quotes the apothegm of "a distinguished Liberal supporter" -"Liberty is the law of human life"only to deny, not its truth, but its "absolute validity."
We no more allow absolute validity to his stock maxim, Liberty is the law of human life, than we allow it to the opposite
• Note the kinds of order to which Joubert refers. "Literary, moral, political,
and religious"-these are also the headings under which Joubert'S work is discussed by Arnold in "Joubert," with only one difference, the separation here of
"moral" and "religious."
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maxim, which is just as true, Renouncement is the law of
human life. For we know that the only perfect freedom is, as
our religion says, a service.
(C. and A., 182)
And the service, of course, is to our "best self," to "the idea of a
perfected humanity." This is Joubert's "subordination," not of one
social class to another, but of all men to right reason; and the result
will be, as Joubert said, "order and arrangement, harmony, the
whole."
Trilling, whose opinion of Joubert is not very high, essays a
summation of his political theory in these words (200): "A staunch
anti-libertarian in the philosophic interest of monarchy, Joubert
admired the Chinese fixity of government, order and the abandonment of passion." Like the doctrinaire Liberal's statement which
Arnold controverted, this statement contains some truth without
being absolutely valid. So far as Joubert's preference for monarchy
is concerned, the key word is philosophic. It is true that he says,
"Ceux qui veulent gouverner aiment la republique; ceux qui veulent etre bien gouvernes n'aiment que la monarchie" (XIV, 4). The
blessing of unity, to Joubert's mind, seems more easily achievable
in a state with one head than in a state with many. Yet he does not
admire unity without his beloved justice, and his preference is for
a constitutional rather than an absolute monarchy: "Tout autorite
legitime doit aimer son etendu et ses limites" (XIV, 17; italics mine).
To say that he "admired the Chinese fixity of government" is to
misread somewhat the long paragraph printed as XVI, 92. Joubert
says the rulers of the Chinese have often been conquered, "mais
jamais leurs moeurs"; and he goes on to ask: "La duree n'est-elle
pas un signe de l'excellence, dans les lois, comme l'utilite et la clarte
sont un caractere de verite, dans les systemes?" His admiration is
directed toward the perseverance of worth as manifested in law and
custom, rather than the rigidity of human attitudes as shown in the
administration of law, which latter is what we more commonly term
"government." (The recurrent collapse of dynasties automatically
made "fixity of government," in the normal sense, impossible.)
Joubert clearly does not respect the mere absence of change, in any
case. The laws and customs of the Chinese have endured because
they are able to produce a kind of society which Joubert considers
very close to his ideal, a society "ou Ie pouvoir, Ie ministre et Ie
sujet" are "fortement et ... distinctement unis, separes, establis."
Joubert does not, it may be remarked, recommend a like system to
all nations; indeed, he does not recommend "fixity" as a part of
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any political system. "Les constitutions politiques ont besoin d'elasticite; elles la perdent, lorsque tout y est regIe par des lois fixes, et,
pour ainsi dire, inflexibles" (XIV, 20). "Fixity in government" is
good only insofar as it is founded on, and protective of, unity and
justice; and these are qualities of the mind, not of machinery. Machinery should therefore be flexible, that it may be accommodated
to advancing concepts of unity and justice. This is not, we can see,
very far from Arnold's position.
It must be admitted, however, that Joubert'S opinions seem at
first sight to be less related to political actualities than Arnold's.
Their aphoristic form, and the almost complete absence of topical
references, reinforce the illusion of remoteness. By comparison, the
Arnold of Culture and Anarchy and Friendship's Garland is a journalist, though of a far higher order than such a man as G. A. Sala,
one of his favorite targets. 6 These two books contain a wealth of
contemporary allusions, many totally incomprehensible, without
annotation, to the modern reader. Arnold recognized the journalistic nature of his style in Friendship's Garland when he dated the
letters of which it is composed from Grub Street. Arnold was writing
to his age, and perforce had to write to a great extent of his age.
Nevertheless, the political book which is likely to survive the
longest is Culture and Anarchy; and the parts of Culture and Anarchy which are likely to be read longest are those which are relatively free of contemporary material: the Preface, "Sweetness and
Light," "Hebraism and Hellenism," and "Porro Unum Est Necessarium."
Culture and Anarchy contains, and develops chiefly in these
chapters, Arnold's most famous use of the symbolism of light. This
use differs somewhat from his use of light in his writings on religion.
Here and in most of his prose it is a symbol of intelligence only,
as it is throughout Western intellectual history, and not of any
emotional grace added to intelligence. "Of perfection, as pursued
by culture, beauty and intelligence, or, in other words, sweetness
and light, are the main characters" (C. and A., 44).
To sweetness and light are opposed the "fire and strength" of
Henry Sidgwick, the utilitarian philosopher (C. and A., 145). Sidgwick says that fire and strength are the characteristics of "religion"of a primarily emotional attachment to righteousness. Arnold, while
• Cf. C. and A., xiii: "a flight of Corinthian leading articles, and an irruption
of Mr. G. A. Sala. Clearly, this is not what will do us good." The references
passim. in Friendship's Garland often mention Sala's newspaper, the Telegraph,
when Sala is meant, in a kind of metonymy.
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recognlzmg the importance of emotion in the formation of a religious attitude, will not allow such an oversimplified metaphorical
description of religion. "By religion, let me explain, Mr. Sidgwick
here means particularly that Puritanism on the insufficiency of
which I have been commenting." He means, in other words, Hebraism, which is insufficient because it imagines that only emotion and
right conduct are necessary in human life. "With us ... the ruling
force is now, and long has been, a Puritan force,-the care for fire
and strength, strictness of conscience, Hebraism, rather than the
care for sweetness and light, spontaneity of consciousness, Hellenism" (C. and A., 147).
We must conclude that the flame of feeling, which in Literature
and Dogma enkindles morality and transforms it into religion, is
not to be confused with this Hebraistic fire which consumes all
aspects of life not directed by or dedicated to "conscience and moral
sense," or else we must suppose that between 1867 and 1873 Arnold's
attitude toward emotion in religion underwent a fairly complete
volte-face. The first of these alternatives, I think, is more tenable.
The dichotomy which Sidgwick sets up, and which Arnold accepts in Culture and Anarchy, is between knowing and doing; in
Literature and Dogma, the less pronounced contrast is between conduct without emotion and conduct with it. And the emotion of
Literature and Dogma is a specifically religious emotion, which we
usually term "piety." The "fire" which Sidgwick extols is a harsher
thing; it combines at best a little piety with a very great amount of
what we call zeal; and Arnold significantly refuses to consider Sidgwick's attitude as primarily religious. He calls it "Puritanism," and
he regards Puritanism as a social and not a religious phenomenon.
His literalist opponents of Literature and Dogma are nowhere in
that book, nor in any other of his religious books, referred to as
Puritans. His description of the origin of English Puritanism (C. and
A., 137-138) is noteworthy for the absence of any reference to religion, to the Bible, to anything except social and moral considerations.
Puritanism, which has been so great a power in the English
nation, and in the strongest part of the English nation, was
originally the reaction in the seventeenth century of the conscience and moral sense of our race, against the moral indifference and lax rule of conduct which in the sixteenth
century came in with the Renascence.
The "fire" of Culture and Anarchy, then, is emotional zeal directed
into avenues of human endeavor which are not proper places for
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emotion's influence. The enkindling flame of emotion in Literature
and Dogma is necessary for the very existence of religion, which
without it would remain only morality. The two are not identical;
if they are related at all, the first is a perverted and unwarranted
extension of the second.
The light of Culture and Anarchy is presented in language at
once more vivid and more elevated than can be found in any of
Arnold's other works wherein the symbol appears. One passage
from "Sweetness and Light" will amply illustrate this.
Again and again I have insisted how those are the happy mo·
ments of humanity, how those are the marking epochs of a
people's life, how those are the flowering times for literature
and art and all the creative power of genius, when there is a
national glow of life and thought, when the whole of society
is in the fullest measure permeated by thought, sensible to
beauty, intelligent and alive.
(C. and A., 41)
This kind of thought is intelligent, but not intellectualized; the
phrase "sensible to beauty" opens the door to right feeling as well
as right cognition. When the mental and spiritual perfection which
culture studies is fostered by the State and expressed by individuals
in their lives, the result will be a "glow" of thought which will il·
lumine the entire nation. Those who in past times walked in darkness will not only see, but dwell in, a truly great light. It is a worthy
goal for any society.
Joubert's use of the imagery of light in his political pensees
seems quite sparing, compared with Arnold's use of it in Culture
and Anarchy. On the few occasions when it does appear, however,
it is in statements which express attitudes quite similar to Arnold's.
One of these is the pensee about "deplorables epoques" which serves
as an epigraph for this chapter. Another, in which "nous" stands
for the people of Restoration France, pictures them as close approximations of the "fire and strength" men whom Arnold combatted; resembling them not in their Puritanism, but in their trust
in "the one thing needful"-earnest but unpremeditated action.
"Nous sommes, en politique, presque tous remplis d'un feu qui ne
fait que nous agiter, et d'un lumiere qui ne fait que nous eblouir"
(XVIII, 35). And the pensee which immediately follows this, speaking of the shadows which are taken for lights, is one of Joubert's
expressions of the distrust of machinery which he shares with Arnold, although the machinery here is that of political theory rather
than that of action.
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Pouvoir legislatif, executif, etc., ce ne sont Ia que des chif£res. On a porte dans la politique, et jusque dans la morale,
les procedes et presque Ie langage de l'algebre; on se sert de
mots abstraits au lieu de lettres; on les combine, et l'on croit
s'entendre et s'eclairer, parce qu'on a remue des ombres. Et,
en efIet, ces mots nouveaux, ces notions obscures ne sont pour
l'esprit que des ombres sans corps, sans realite, sans beaute.
(XVIII,36)
So far as ideas are concerned, the rest of Arnold's political
writings offer little more than restatements-stylistic variations and
shifts of emphasis-of those contained in Culture and Anarchy. The
"Geist" of Letter I in Friendship's Garland ("I introduce Arminius
and 'Geist' to the British Public") is only culture with a German
name; the triumph of "Geist" is "the victory of reason and intelligence over blind custom and prejudice" (F. G., 248). "Numbers; or,
the Majority and the Remnant" (D. Amer., 1-71) is chiefly remarkable for its emphasis on the saving minority-"the very small remnant which honestly sought wisdom" (15) in Plato's Athens, the
"holy seed" which Isaiah said would save Israel-in whom is found
an understanding of their "best self." Arnold holds forth a better
hope for nineteenth-century nations than Athens and Israel had,
because their remnants are larger although not, by definition, large.

In our great modern States, where the scale of things is so
large, it does seem as if the remnant might be so increased as
to become an actual power, even though the majority be unsound. Then the lover of wisdom may come out from under
his wall, the lover of goodness will not be alone among the
wild beasts. To enable the remnant to succeed, a large
strengthening of its numbers is everything.
(D. Amer., 26)
It is the desire to increase the remnant, both in numbers and
in sagacity, which is at the bottom of Arnold's books on education,
which deserve at least a brief mention in a study of his social criticism. The three best known-Popular Education in France (1861);
A French Eton; or, Middle-Class Education and the State (1864);
and Schools and Universities on the Continent (1868)-are the results
of Arnold's official participation in a Royal Commission's study
of Continental education. A fourth book, not published during
Arnold's lifetime, is in many ways more valuable than these as an
exposition of his opinions on education. This is Reports on Elementary Schools, 1852-1882 (published 1889), a complete collection of
the reports which he annually presented to the Education Depart-
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ment on the conditions of schools, the qualifications of teachers,
and the progress of pupils in his inspectorial district.
Arising as they do from professional experience, these reports
have an empirical air about them which Joubert's remarks on edu·
cation do not and were not intended to have. Joubert's chapter "De
I'Education" contains only sixty pensees, all brief, all concerned
with "une education noble et lettf(~e" (XIX, 49)-an ideal education, not an actual system observed in its daily workings. Yet some
of Joubert's cardinal ideas will be found in Arnold's reports, in
those passages which suggest improvements in method and matter.
These suggestions for improvement are found chiefly in the
reports for the years between 1862 and 1876. The Report of 1863
was the first made under the Revised Code, a sweeping new education law with whose principles and provisions Arnold was in almost
complete disagreement, and whose effects he saw with something
close to horror. The Revised Code assumed that the only measure
of a school's efficiency was the percentage of students who passed
the annual examination in reading, writing, and arithmetic conducted by the inspectors. Each student who failed the examination
lost for the school his "grant," the sum which the school was paid
by the government for the education of an individual pupil; this
system of punishment for presumed inefficiency came to be known
as "Payment by Results." To Arnold the most real and most baneful
"result" of the Code was that teachers and students alike made it
their chief concern to prepare for an examination which attempted
to deal with all school children in less time than twelve hours per
year in each institution, and which even at its best could not fail
to be superficial. Consequently, the teachers taught and the pupils
learned a few specific and rather simple examples to illustrate principles in language and mathematics which the students did not
really comprehend.
In his Report for 1869, Arnold set down most forcefully and
most completely his objections to the Revised Code.
I have repeatedly said that it seems to me the great fault of
the Revised Code, and of the famous plan of payment by results, that it fosters teaching by rote; I am of that opinion still
.... The school examinations in view of payment by results
are ... a game of mechanical contrivance in which the teachers will and must more and more learn how to best us. It is
found possible, by ingenious preparation, to get children
through the Revised Code examinations in reading, writing,
and ciphering, without their really knowing how to read,
write, and cipher.
(R.E.S., 136)
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He goes on to particularize: the children are given their reading
examination from a single book, and consequently they are set to
reading this book over and over again during the year, in preparation; their writing test consists of setting down, from dictation, a
passage from the same book; their arithmetic test is designed "to
ensure that . . . a child shall be able to turn out, worked right,
two out of three sums of a certain sort" (137), and this too can be
done without any real knowledge: "he is taught the mechanical
rule by which sums of this sort are worked, and sedulously practised
all the year round in working them."
Here is education not only touched by, but transformed into,
the worship of machinery. The mind subjected to such miseducation will be in danger of itself becoming a mechanical thing,
Arnold suggests, understanding facts but not the laws which produce and regulate them. Every teacher should resist such a wrong
tendency, by refusing to become a crammer, "a mere lader with
'information'" (R.E.S., 258); instead, he should be allowed to emphasize those studies which Arnold calls "formative" (210). Arnold's
use of this word is interesting, and the Report for 1878, which introduces it, is one of his most significant statements on the nature
of true education.
By "formative" studies Arnold means those which have power
to shape the mind and to give it an inclination or direction toward
intellectual pursuits. "The great fault of the instruction in our
elementary schools . . . is, that it at most gives to a child the mechanical possession of the instruments of knowledge, but does
nothing to form him, to put him in a way of making the best possible use of them" (R.E.S., 163). Reading, writing, "calculating" of
themselves are not formative; but the study of good poetry and of
the nature of grammar are formative. The latter bring into play
the rational faculty; the former require the use of memory only.
To learn the definitions and rules of grammar is, indeed, but
an exercise of memory. But, after learning the definition of
a noun, to recognize nouns when one meets with them, and
to refer them to their definition, that is an exercise of intelligence.
(R.E.S., 190)

The addition to the curriculum of "formative" subjects, and to
the school faculties of persons qualified to teach them, was one of
the principal causes to which Arnold dedicated the latter half of his
professional career. Some recommendation about these matters is
found in almost every report from 1872 on.
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Behind this attitude of Arnold's there are of course many influences, not least his own natural predilection for "letters" and other
avenues of intellectual culture. But there are also two of Joubert's
pensees which, taken together, bespeak an extraordinarily similar
sentiment about the proper aim of education.
La direction de notre esprit est plus importante que son
progreso
(XIX, 34)
Souvenons-nous-en bien, l' education ne consiste pas seulement a orner la memoire et a eclairer l'entendement; elle doit
surtout s'occuper a diriger la volonte.
(XIX, 12)
Direction is to Joubert the most important service which education can give to the mind and the will. If they are shown the right
path to pursue, their progress upon it will be assured, and the
memory and understanding will be adorned and enlightened naturally. Arnold, seeing progress in a wrong direction virtually enjoined by the Revised Code, and having to examine countless children whose memories had been adorned at the expense of their
understanding, may well have called to mind these aphorisms.
Another of Joubert's educational ideals is emphasized by Arnold
in this same Report for 1878. This second ideal is that of simplicity.
"Ne montrez aux enfants rien que de simple, de peur de leur gater
Ie gout," Joubert cautions (XIX, 25); and on children's reading:
"Aux enfants, en litterature, rien que de simple" (XIX, 39). Joubert
does not amplify these remarks much. Simplicity in education is
but one aspect of that simplicity which, as the next chapter will
show, he loved above almost every other quality of the mind and
its works.
Arnold's emphasis on simplicity, for the particular purposes of
the Report, is founded on practicality. It is directed against a
movement, in some educational circles of Arnold's day, toward the
use of supposedly wonder-working new "methods" of teaching, most
of them founded on the work of Pestalozzi. Arnold urges teachers to
attend more closely to the significant (the "formative") in their
subject matter, and when they have this well in hand no sophistication of methodology will be necessary.
The best thing for a teacher to do is surely to put before
himself in the utmost simplicity the problem he has to solve.
He has to instruct children between the ages of four and thirteen, children, too, who have for the most part a singularly
narrow range of words and thoughts .... He has to give them
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some knowledge of the world in which they find themselves,
and of what happens and has happened in it; ... He has to
do as much towards opening their mind, and opening their
soul and imagination, as is possible to be done with a number
of children of their age and in their state of preparation and
home surroundings.
There is the problem for him. He will find that in seeking
to solve it he can quite well work on the old lines without
busying himself with new and (so-called) scientific theories of
education.
(R.E.S., 213, 214)
"Opening their mind, and opening their soul and imagination"
-this is for Arnold the true aim of all instruction. It is also a necessary preliminary to the right direction of the will, since for the will
to be directed rightly, it must be controlled by an informed intelligence. Joubert would probably subscribe willingly to Arnold's statement of the teacher's problem.
In summary, Arnold and Joubert may be found in agreement
on some very fundamental aspects of social theory and practice: the
danger inherent in an overvaluation of personal liberty, the error
of worshiping action and machinery, the eminent worth of order
and justice in a state. Both men may be classed as moderates in
social and political thought, with Joubert the more conservative of
the two, and in that largely reflecting his times. Arnold's chief
contribution is his concept of culture as a "social idea" (C. and A.,
42) which includes and helps to propagate order, justice, and right
reason. His life's work as an inspector of schools was a valiant attempt to transform this "social idea" into a living reality for English
schoolchildren. Indeed, in all his efforts as the apostle of culture to
the society of his day, Arnold attempted to actualize these basic ideas
which he shared with Joubert. The ideas themselves were almost
certainly not taken directly from Joubert; their most probable origin
was in Arnold's extensive reading of the earliest political scientists,
Plato and Aristotle. But Arnold's regard for the epigrammatic ability with which Joubert stated social views derived from the same
source is well supported by the evidence of quotation and allusion
in his own essays.
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"The Pure and Antique Clearness":
Joubert and Arnold's Literary Criticism

Soyez profond en termes clairs, et non pas en termes obscurs. Les choses difficiles deviendront a leur tour aisees; rna is
il faut porter du charme dans ce qu'on approfondit, et faire
entrer, dans les cavernes sombres, OU l'on n'a penetre que
de puis peu, la pure et ancienne clarte des siecles moins instruits, mais plus lumineux que Ie notre.
Joseph Joubert, Pensees, XXIII: 36
I have pointed out how widely, in translating Homer, a man
even of real ability and learning may go astray, unless he
brings to the study of this clearest of poets the quality in
which our English authors, with all their great gifts, are apt
to be somewhat wanting-simple lucidity of mind.
Matthew Arnold, On Translating Homer

To Joubert and Arnold, it seemed evident that the critical spirit
could find few more congenial or more important occupations than
the consideration of literature. The four concluding chapters of
Joubert's Pensees, two hundred pages out of a total of seven hundred, are given over to literary criticism: "De la Poesie," "Du Style,"
"Des Qualites de l'Ecrivain et des Compositions litteraires," and
"Jugements litteraires." Arnold's three volumes of Essays in Criticism-the first two of which, with Culture and Anarchy, remain his
most significant prose work-frequently express opinions on matters other than literary, but for all that are firmly based upon the
authors and the literary works which are their subjects. Essays in
Criticism, On the Study of Celtic Literature, On Translating Homer,
and such occasional shorter essays as "Preface to the Six Chief Lives
from johnson's Lives of the Poets" (in Irish Essays)-these contain
the bulk of Arnold's "jugements litteraires," and form no small part
of his total prose production.
All these works were written after Arnold had read Joubert,
with the exception of On Translating Homer; we can trace in them
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frequent shared sympathies as well as some reasonably certain influences. In addition, Arnold wrote one early critical essay which is
worthy of notice here, because it manifests several critical attitudes,
already well formulated, which probably made him more than ordinarily receptive to Joubert's ideas. This is the Preface to his
Poems of 1853.
The Preface begins, like most of Arnold's literary criticism, with
attention to a particular work-in this case, one of his own. The
dramatic poem Empedocles on Etna, which had occupied the place
of honor in the volume Arnold had published the previous year,
was not reprinted in this book; and approximately the first third
of the Preface is devoted to a justification of Arnold's action. Arnold
omitted the poem because, in his opinion, it was lacking in the
elements which constitute true literary art. From an exposition of
the elements lacking in Empedocles, Arnold proceeds naturally to
a discussion of these elements in the abstract: "the eternal objects
of Poetry, among all nations, and at all times" (Pre/.,274).
The elements of poetry are of two kinds: those embodied in the
subject and those manifested in the author's treatment of the subject. The only subjects of which true poetry can be made, Arnold
says, are "human actions" which are "interesting" and "excellent."
"What actions are the most excellent? Those, certainly, which most
powerfully appeal to the great primary human affections: to those
elementary feelings which subsist permanently in the race" (Pre/.,
275). The excellence of an action arises, not only from its permanent
appeal or "interest" to the human affections, but from its cathartic
power upon those affections; and it derives this power from the
qualities of will-resolution and nobility-exhibited by the man
whose action it is, and necessary in order that the action may be
performed. The excellent action provides, by its nature, relief for
the suffering of its performer and for the aroused emotions of
spectators and readers.
The plot of Empedocles belongs to a group of situations which
have not this excellence, and for this reason it was not reprinted.
What then are the situations, from the representation of
which, though accurate, no poetical enjoyment can be derived? They are those in which the suffering finds no vent in
action; in which a continuous state of mental distress is prolonged, unrelieved by incident, hope, or resistance; in which
there is everything to be endured, nothing to be done. In such
situations there is inevitably something morbid, in the description of them something monotonous. When they occur
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in actual life they are painful, not tragic; the representation
of them in poetry is painful also.
(Pre/.,273)
The "morbid" situation-passivity and suffering without a climax
of resolution and action-cannot give enjoyment to the reader,
whereas the excellent action, though often tragic, can. "It is not
enough," Arnold says (Pre/., 272), "that the Poet should add to the
knowledge of men, it is required of him also that he should add to
their happiness." In the same paragraph he quotes Schiller as
saying, "The right Art is that alone, which creates the highest
enjoyment." Poetry must "inspirit and rejoice the reader"; it must
"convey a charm, and infuse delight." A tragic situation, with resolution and action, can produce the happiness which Trilling describes as "the stability or poise of the faculties ... the quieting
of the mind in equilibrium.... Nothing can assure that eventual
equilibrium save action, for by action all the confusions of the
emotions are cleared" (Trilling, 137-138). The "morbid" situation
is nothing but "the confusions of the emotions"; Empedocles broods
on religious questions and doubts, and his only action is to commit
suicide.
Arnold, in making these comments and in removing Empedocles
from the canon of his works, is attempting to combat, in his literary
world and in himself, a popular poetic tendency which he regards
as pernicious. At the middle of the century, an ephemeral but vocal
literary faction-now known by the name a parodist gave them, the
"Spasmodics" -argued, by precept and example, that poetry's function was simply to picture what one might call the soliloquy of a
passion, or the struggle of several, within the poet's mind. 1 Arnold
quotes the remark of an unidentified critic only to disparage it; the
critic is uttering a Spasmodic tenet, and in Arnold's terms is promoting morbidity.
The modern critic not only permits a false practice; he absolutely prescribes false aims. "A true allegory of the state of
one's own mind in a representative history," the poet is told,

1 As W. E. Aytoun, the parodist mentioned, put it: "The office of poetry is to
exhibit the passions in that state of excitement which distinguishes one from
the other" ("Firmilian," in The Works of W. E. Aytoun [London, 1921J, p. 295).
Whether passions, in a "state of excitement," are not just as likely to fuse as to
separate seems a legitimate psychological question. Joanna Baillie's Plays of the
Passions seem, in philosophy as well as diction, to be recognizable forerunners
of such Spasmodic productions as Alexander Smith's A Lite Drama and Sidney
Dobell's The Roman.
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"is perhaps the highest thing that one can attempt in the
way of poetry." And accordingly he attempts it. An allegory
of the state of one's own mind, the highest problem of an art
which imitates actions! No, assuredly, it is not, it never can
be so: no great poetical work has ever been produced with
such an aim.
(Pref., 281-282)2
It may be questioned here whether Arnold, who was sometimes

prone to literalism in statement and interpretation, realized at this
time that the Aristotelian "action" of tragedy is partially and sometimes largely mental; ethe and pathe may be represented (as indeed
those of Empedocles are) by soliloquy or by a number of devices
which are not in Arnold's sense actions. However, the critic's statement, as a description of poetry's highest possible achievement, is
ridiculously oversimplified. Arnold turns from it, and gives his own
formulation of the poetic summum bonum: the poet is "most fortunate, when he most entirely succeeds in effacing himself, and in
enabling a noble action to subsist as it did in nature" (Pref-> 281).
For the artistry by which this noble action is presented, Arnold
uses a term which he will return to, eight years later, and will make
central to his literary criticism-the grand style. This is the style
pre-eminently of the Greeks; it made of their works "the highest
models of expression" (Pref., 277). Arnold does not define the grand
style in the Preface, but he describes it as he finds it in the Greek
writers.
Their expression is so excellent because it is so admirably
kept in its right degree of prominence; because it is so simple
and so well subordinated; because it draws its force directly
from the pregnancy of the matter which it conveys.
(Pref., 277-278)
The grand style may be grand in effect, but it is humble in attitude;
it is necessary and at the same time ancillary to its noble subject,
and those writers who have achieved the grand style have all the
time kept the excellent action uppermost in their thought. With
the Greeks, "the poetical character of the action in itself, and the
conduct of it, was the first consideration" (Pref., 277). This is what
makes familiarity with classic literature so necessary for the writers
of Arnold's own time; for, left to themselves, they have reversed

• Wordsworth's Prelude, as its subtitle ("The Growth of a Poet's Mind, An
Autobiographical Poem") makes clear, fits the unknown critic's specifications
remarkably well; and Arnold disliked it (E. in C., II. 98).
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this emphasis: "With us, attention is fixed mainly on the value of
the separate thoughts and images which occur in the treatment of
an action."
The Preface presents several of the basic critical principles
which Arnold's later work was to amplify: the supremacy of subject
over treatment, of matter over manner, of the whole over the parts;
the essentially Aristotelian character of the poetic subject-"men
in action," action which is the sequel of resolution and the bringer
of joy to the reader; the grand style, a mode of expression characterized by simplicity of utterance and fidelity to "the pregnancy of the
matter which it conveys"; and the superiority of classic over modern authors, owing to their more perfect apprehension of these
artistic requirements. One very important axiom of Arnold's criticism remains; it will appear for the first time in the essay on Joubert. Before considering that essay, however, it will be profitable to
look at the Pensees and note some of the congenial ideas and expressions which Arnold found there. What he found is to some
extent indicated by the quotations in Essays in Criticism, First
Series; but these show only certain aspects of Joubert's critical view,
which in its totality is remarkably conformable to Arnold's cast of
thought.
Joubert's classical predilections are shown in the pensee which
is an epigraph to this chapter (and which is one of Arnold's citations
in "Joubert"), and they appear throughout his four chapters of
literary criticism. He values the classical authors for their clarity,
and also for the closely related quality of simplicity, both of which
enabled them to present profound thoughts understandably. Although, as we shall see, Joubert was rather more sympathetic to
Plato than to Aristotle, in one of his paragraphs on the latter
philosopher he attributes to him four qualities which are the sum,
in Joubert's mind, of classic virtues: "exactitude, facilite, profondeur et clarte" (XXIV, i, 23). Of these the first and last are most
important. They may well be considered the basic criteria by means
of which Joubert separates good writing and thinking from bad.
On Joubert'S exaltation of clarity as a literary virtue, an entire
essay might be written. It is the hallmark of all poetry: "Le caractere
de la poesie est une clarte supreme" (XXI, 29). No less is it necessary
to the aphorism, Joubert'S own art form.
La net tete, la propriete dans les termes, la clarte sont Ie
naturel de la pensee. La transparence est sa beaute. II en
resulte que, pour se montrer naturelle, il faut de l'art a la
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pensee. II n'en faut pas au sentiment; il est chaleur, l'autre
est lumiere.
(XXII, 115)3
"Transparence" is the beauty of the pensee to Joubert; "lucidity of
mind" is later to be the chief grace of good writers to Arnold. The
use of "nettete" here is interesting. Its primary lexical meaning,
"cleanness" or "purity," is certainly evident here; in context, such
secondary senses as "unity" and "distinctness" seem to be present
also. All of these are qualities which Joubert strove to exemplify in
his own writing and thinking. When propriety or suitability of
language is added to "nettete," which in this passage seems to denote
primarily a quality of thought, clarity will be the natural result,
and the pensee will be beautiful in its lucidity. Significantly, none
of this lucidity can be produced by the agency of sentiment, or
emotion, for the nature of emotion is warmth and not light; its
flame does not clarify.
Clarity cannot be achieved, Joubert warns, if the author's eye
is upon himself rather than his subject or his reader. While the
man who seeks exactness and clarity may be accused of "affectation," the writer who regards himself is guilty of the far greater
sin of "pretention."
L'affectation tient surtout aux mots; la pretention, a la
vanite de l'ecrivain. Par l'une, l'auteur semble dire: Je veux
etre clair, ou je veux etre exact, et il ne deplait pas; il semble
dire par l'autre: Je veux briller, et on Ie sime. RegIe generaIe:
toutes les fois que l'ecrivain ne songe qu'a son lecteur, on lui
pardonne; s'il ne songe qu'a lui, on Ie punit.
(XXIII,38)
When an author thinks only of his reader, in Joubert's sense, he
is also thinking truly of his subject, because he regards his reader
as an inquirer to be enlightened concerning the subject. The writer
who thinks chiefly of himself is in a way considering his reader too,
but rather as a spectator to be impressed. Consequently he takes less
trouble to clarify his thought; he wishes to shine, but has no light,
"et on Ie sime." The distinction between affectation and pretense
• Note the distinction between heat and light here. This distinction, which
has been the subject of some comment in connection with other aspects of
Joubert's thought, appears implicitly in a more famous passage-the criticism
of Mme. de Stai!l (XXIV, v, 35). After admitting that she had "un esprit
superieur," he says: "Son imagination a ete seduite par quelque chose qui est
plus brillant que les vrais biens: l'eclat de la Hamme et des feux l'a egaree. . . .
Les passions sont devenues it ses yeux une espece de dignite et de gloire." Arnold
paraphrased this pensee but did not directly quote it (E. in C., I, 296).
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may seem slight to English-speaking persons, and the complacent
attitude toward affectation is difficult to share or to sympathize
with.' But in affectation there is not, as there is in pretense, the
will to deceive and to be self-deceived. And it is the motive which
gains pardon for affectation from Joubert; the desire to be clear
and exact can cover a multitude of sins with its own virtue.
The search for exactness and clarity, while it may bring forth
affectation, more often produces what Joubert calls "Ie naturel
exquis," as opposed to "Ie nature! vulgaire" (XXIII, 40). What is
the naturally exquisite in literary style? It is
l'expression juste, l'expression simple, l'expression la plus
convenable au sujet mis en question, a la pensee qu'on a, au
sentiment dont on est anime, a ce qui precede, a ce qui suit,
a la place qui attend Ie mot.
The naturally exquisite is quite far from the preciosity which the
term "exquisite" so often connotes to the twentieth-century mind.
Joubert gives much more attention to style, to expression, than
Arnold does in the Preface, or in any of his criticism except perhaps
On Translating Homer, yet for Joubert no less than for Arnold
expression in itself is a secondary thing. The right expression is
always "simple" and "convenable au sujet." Joubert's strictures on
style and expression which do not remain subordinate to their subject are severe.
Quand !'image masque l'objet, et que l'on fait de l'ombre
un corps; quand l'expression plait tellement qu'on ne tend
plus a passer outre pour penetrer jusqu'au sens; quand Ie
figure en fin absorbe l'attention tout enti(:re, on est arrete en
chemin, et la route est prise pour la gite, parce qu'un mauvais
guide nous conduit.
(XXII, llO)
Joubert's concern for simplicity appears perhaps most directly
in one of his maxims on education, part of which is quoted in the
preceding chapter. After prescribing for children's reading "rien
que de simple" in literature, he explains: "La simplicite n'a jamais
corrompu Ie go'lit; tout ce qui est poetiquement de£ectueux est
incompatible avec elle" (XIX, 39). It must be noted that Joubert
is not speaking of mere stylistic simplicity, which is often truly affectation. In On Translating Homer, Arnold remarks that in French
• Arnold sometimes found it so. Cf. E. in C., I, 312: "No doubt, if a man
wishes to be II great author, it is to consider too curiously, to consider as Joubert
did:'
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there is a useful word to distinguish such "semblance of simplicity"
(314) from the real thing. "The real quality it calls simplicite, the
semblance simplesse. The one is natural simplicity, the other is
artificial simplicity." Wordsworth's "Michael" is a work of simplicitej his "Goody Blake and Harry Gill" is one of simplesse. Joubert never confuses the two. Simplicite is a quality of mind, as well
as of expression, and the mental quality is necessary to all literary
endeavors. "On peut donner de la simplicite a la richesse; iI faut
Ie faire meme dans tous les genres" (XXIV, iv, II).
His passion, as it may most properly be called, for exactness is
a characteristic which Arnold chooses to emphasize in "Joubert"
(E. in C., I, 284-285). The passages which Arnold quotes are, with
one exception, from Joubert's preliminary chapter, descriptive of
himself and his ideals. It is easy to see how a man who in his eagerness tried to get at ideas and "to do without words" if they were
in the slightest degree unnecessary, and who described his auctorial
mission in such a phrase as "Ce n' est pas ma phrase que je polis,
mais mon idee" (Prel., p. 95), would appeal to the kindred critical
spirit which Arnold was developing in the early 1860's.
Most of the literary pensees which Arnold thought important
enough to quote in "Joubert" are judgments on particular authors.
Some, like those in the preceding paragraph and at the head of this
chapter, are concerned with Joubert's love of clarity, simplicity,
and exactness; Arnold is at pains to communicate this attitude. 5
Oddly, several paragraphs upon a subject with which Arnold had
recently dealt-paragraphs expressing opinions with which Arnold
was in fairly complete agreement-are not quoted. Yet it may be
assumed that the pleasurable surprise of discovering Joubert's estimate of Homer and of what Arnold had called "the grand style"
added considerably to his appreciation of Joubert.
The lectures On Translating Homer, published in 1861, together with the Last Words published the following year in answer
to Arnold's opponents, began as a study of the art of translation
and rapidly broadened into a definition of literary nobility and an
attempt to show the reasons for its absence from nineteenth-century
England. It is a criticism as much of the men and the ethical conditions which produce literature as it is of literature itself, and as
• Cf. E. in C., I, 307. "He thought the truth was never really and worthily
said, so long as the least cloud, clumsiness, and repulsiveness hung about the
expression of it. Some of his best passages are those in which he upholds this
doctrine." By their position in the essay, these two sentences serve as a general
introduction to all the quotations.
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such it is a significant expression of the scope of Arnold's mind. As
a work of literary criticism, it is most important for its full description of the grand style, which the Preface of 1853 had dealt with
only by hints and indirections.
"I think it will be found," Arnold says (Trans. H., 289), "that
the grand style arises in poetry, when a noble nature, poetically
gifted, treats with simplicity or with severity a serious subject." This
is no simple definition. Included are the human qualities of the
artist (Ha noble nature") and a restriction upon subject matter ("a
serious subject"), as well as those qualities in the writer and his art
which one is more apt to associate with literary style ("poetically
gifted . . . with simplicity or with severity"). And in spite of
Arnold's assertion that the definition "contains no terms ... which
themselves need defining," most readers will find that the use of
the word "severity" makes the explanation and illustrations which
follow (290-291) necessary for an adequate understanding of Arnold's meaning.
The distinction between "severe" and "simple" is more than
a mere attempt at classification; it seems to be also, to judge from
the kind of treatment given each style, a reflection of Arnold's
literary value system. Arnold says (Trans. H., 290): "In a former
lecture I pointed out what ... severity of poetical style is." He is
evidently referring to the discussion of Milton (224-225); but while
the concept is there, the word is not; "austere" is the closest substitute, and in writing on Milton Arnold emphasizes "fulness" and
"condensation," rather than austerity. Even after Arnold has gone
through the process of exemplifying the grand style severe, it is far
from being as clearly defined as the style of Homer. Arnold's "severity" is little more than our modern "compression," added to the
general characteristics of the grand style. It is certain that Arnold
preferred simplicity to severity: "Both these styles, the simple and
the severe, are truly grand; ... But the simple is no doubt to be
preferred" (Trans. H., 292). Doubtless he also felt more at ease
when discussing simplicity. There is very little of the "severe," it
may be remarked, in any of the famous touchstones. 6

• Jacques l\Iaritain, in Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (New York,
1953) , makes a useful distinction between poems which are "obscure in essence"
and those which are only "obscure in appearance." The latter, he says, are clear
in essence, and he describes them in tenus which at once resemble and illumi·
nate those which .Arnold uses to describe the grand style severe. Arnold describes
Milton's style thus (Trans, R., 224): "Milton charges himself so full with
thought, imagination, knowledge, that his style will hardly contain them. . ..
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Homer's own grand style is given a much more specific description. Arnold isolates four qualities of Homer, at once his most important properties and those least grasped by his English translators.
The translator of Homer should above all be penetrated by
a sense of four CJualities of his author;-that he is eminently
rapid; that he IS eminently plain and direct, both in the
evolution of his thought and in the expression of it, that is,
both in his syntax and in his words; that he is eminently
plain and direct in the substance of his thought, that is, in his
manner and ideas; and finally, that he is eminently noble.
(Trans. H., 162)
Of these four characteristics, the last-here, as on page 289, referring
to the nobility of the artist's mind rather than the nobility of the
subject-is the most important for the purposes of Arnold's lectures,
for it is the quality most completely missed by Francis Newman, the
latest translator to enter the Homeric lists. Newman's translation
failed "more conspicuously" than others because it lacked nobility;
and it lacked nobility, Arnold strongly hints elsewhere, because
Newman was not noble. "To make a man's poetry rapid, as to make
it noble, nothing can serve him so much as to have, in his own
nature, rapidity and nobleness. It is the spirit that quickeneth"
(Trans. H., 219).
So the grand style is even more eminently noble than simple,
and it is exercised by a noble spirit as well as upon a noble subject. It will be seen that this concern with nobility and with the
human nature of the artist is very similar to that manifested
throughout one of the important treatises of classical criticismOn the Sublime, attributed to Longinus. This work had prior to
Arnold's time influenced a number of literary and aesthetic theorists, among Englishmen most notably Edmund Burke (A Philosophical Inquiry intQ the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and
Beautiful, 1757) and Sir Joshua Reynolds (Discourses Delivered to
the Students of the Royal Academy, 1769-1790). Arnold's statements
about and attitude toward "nobility" are almost duplications of the
classical author's views on the sublime. Also, both writers (Arnold
much more than his predecessor, however) are interested in those
All this fulness, this pressure, this condensation, this self-constraint, enters into
his movement, and makes it what it is,-noble, but difficult and austere." Maritain
says of poems which are "obscure in appearance": "Th~ir obscurity comes in
reality . . . from the heavy concentrated intelligibility and the complexity of
logical connotations with which they are burdened'· (p. 194) .
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conditions in their societies which inhibit the activities of noble
souls and the production of noble art.
The eighth chapter of On the Sublime enumerates five "principal sources" of sublimity.7 These are of two kinds: the first two,
"the power of forming great conceptions" and "inspired passion,"
are qualities found in the nature of the artist; the others-the
formation of figures of speech, "noble diction," and elevated composition-are qualities found in the artistic expression itself. In this
basic enumeration no limitation is placed on subject matter, but
the two classes of sublime qualities otherwise correspond to Arnold's
division of nobility into that of the creator and that of his creation.
The ninth chapter begins with the assertion that "the first of
the conditions mentioned, namely elevation of mind, holds the
foremost rank among them all." Unfortunately, after twenty lines
of discussion of this topic, the manuscript breaks off; several pages
are missing at this point. Yet in this small space we have such sentences as "Sublimity is the echo of a great soul" and "The truly
eloquent must be free from low and ignoble thoughts" to show us
how closely parallel the main theses of Longinus and Arnold are.
Since "elevation of mind" is the fountainhead from which all elevation of style must flow, it is obviously of supreme importance,
and a writer like Francis Newman or Hesiods who lacks elevation
of mind is truly without "the one thing needful."
A natural consequence of this concern with the artist's nobility
or lack of it is the emphasis placed by both authors on the ignobility
of their times. The presence of a defect in the whole fabric of society will at least partially explain its presence in the life and work
of society's individual members; it will also serve, by contrast, to
heighten the value of that good quality which is its opposite.
Longinus touches on this only in the forty-fourth and last section
of his treatise, but this placement of the discussion and the seriousness of his tone show that he regarded the problem as a serious one.
His condemnation of the spirit of his age is not very similar to
Arnold's, for his chief animus is directed against the love of luxury
and the spiritual sloth which results from it.
Among the banes of the natures which our age produces must
be reckoned that half-heartedness in which the life of all of
• All quotations from On the Sublime are from the translation by W. Rhys
Roberts (Cambridge, England, 1899), pp. 57·63 and 161.
• In On the Sublime, a line from Hesiod is given (p. 61) as an example of
complete and obvious absence of elevation; the poet, describing Sorrow, wrote:
"Rheum from her nostrils was trickling."
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us with few exceptions is passed, for we do not labour or exert
ourselves except for the sake of praise and pleasure, never for
those solid benefits which are a worthy object of our own
efforts and the respect of others.
Arnold's criticism of his age is found mainly in Culture and Anarchy and Friendship's Garland, rather than in On Translating
Homer, and has been discussed in the previous chapter. Not the
absence of energy, but the omnipresence in English life of an energy not adequately directed by intelligence, was for him one of
the chief causes of ignobility, in Francis Newman as much as in
political figures like John Bright. But the conclusion reached by
both men is the same: sublimity and nobility are not fostered by
the conditions of modem life.
This growing preoccupation with nobility on Arnold's part is
closely akin to a similar attitude which informs all Joubert's literary
criticism. Joubert has his own criteria by which the grandeur of a
style may be judged, and the nobility of the author's spirit is one
of the chief among them. "Le plus humble style donne Ie gout du
beau, s'il exprime la situation d'une ame grande et belle" (XXII,
82). When Joubert writes of particular authors, he usually considers the question of their spiritual nobility, explicitly or implicitly. Corneille and Racine are compared, and Corneille is given the
palm, because his works manifest a grander spirit, although those
of Racine are more artistically finished. "Beaucoup plus parfait que
Corneille, et moins grand, Racine doit etre moins revere" (XXIV, v,
8). The pensee which precedes this is even more illuminating. "On
reproche a Corneille ses grands mots et ses grands sentiments; mais
pour nous elever, et ne pas etre salis par les bassesses de la terre,
il nous faut en tous des echasses" (XXIV, v, 7). Here we see the
weakness inherent in any exaltation of nobility-the overrefined distaste for "les bassesses de la terre." Words and sentiments which
are merely grandiose will truly be stilts, artificial aids to an artificial elevation; and an elevation so reached will have little in
common with "la situation d'une ame grande et belle." Arnold
occasionally notices this tendency in "Joubert," but criticizes it only
mildly, because (as will shortly appear) it is a tendency which he
shares.
To Joubert, nobility is an obligation which both the artist and
his work must fulfil. Arnold's own esteem of nobility, in 1861, is
scarcely less high. In 1853 he had echoed Schiller's judgment that
art is dedicated to Joy; eight years later he seems almost to be at one
with Joubert's opinion, clearly implied if not declared, that art is
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dedicated to Nobility. To some extent this is the difference between
The Strayed Reveller and Merope, manifested in criticism; but
there is actually less distance between these standpoints than might
be imagined. For Arnold, joy is always "inspiriting"; it raises and
ennobles the human soul. His conception of the noble nature of
joy, implicit in the Preface of 1853, is most succinctly expressed in
the poem "Obermann Once More" (1865):
And yet men have such need of joy!
But joy whose grounds are true;
And joy that should all hearts employ
As when the past was new....
What still of strength is left, employ
That end to help attain:
One common wave of thought and joy
Lifting mankind again!
(Poems I, pp. 312, 315, 11. 237-240,321-324)
The joy which springs from truth and is the companion of thought
is indeed a noble force in the life of man.
Arnold must have noticed, in reading the Pensees, two interesting parallels between his remarks on Homer and those of Joubert.
Arnold says that Homer is "rapid" and emphasizes this quality of
his style, listing it first and discussing (Trans. H., 163-168) the failures of Chapman and Cowper when they attempted to reproduce
it. Joubert counsels all writers of "serious" poetry to imitate that
swiftness of movement, coupled with grandeur of expression, which
Homer uses in depicting action.
II faut que Ie vers serieux avance a grands pas, et non en
pietinant. II doit donner a la rapidite, quand il veut la
peindre, Ie marche des dieux d'Homere: "II fait un pas, et
i1 arrive."
(XXI,36)
Joubert opens his twenty-fourth chapter, "Jugements litteraires,"
with a paragraph on the translation of Homer into French, which
expresses some opinions similar to Arnold's thoughts on English
versions.
II n'y aura jamais de traduction d'Homere supportable,
si tous les mots n'en sont choisis avec art et pleins de variete,
de nouveaute et d'agrement. II faut, d'ailleurs, que I'expression soit aussi antique, aussi nue que les moeurs, les evenements et les personnages mis en scene. Avec notre style
modeme, tout grimace dans Homere, et ses heros semblent
des grotesques qui font les graves et les fiers.
(XXIV, i, 1)

54

/

A Fugitive and Gracious Light .

The desire for "nouveaute" may seem at first to indicate a preference for the faddish in language, such as Francis Newman certainly possessed or was possessed by; but such a desire would be
greatly at variance with the whole tenor of Joubert's criticism. The
right style for a French translation of Homer is "novel" in relation
to the neo-classic French style of Racine and Boileau and their
eighteenth-century followers; it would be something new to French
literature, and the next sentence explains why. The style should
be as "antique" and as "naked" as the plot and characters require,
and the modern style in French poetry meets neither of these specifications. On the contrary, it makes Homer grotesque. The Alexandrine of Parny, like the ballad measure of Newman, is no fit
vehicle for nobility-of subject, of style, or of soul.
It is scarcely to be wondered at that Arnold, when he came to
write "Joubert" (1863), declared that the French writer's literary
maxims possess a "purged and subtle delicacy" (E. in C., I, 319).
Purged of modern ignobleness and morbidity by his love and understanding of the classic authors, made delicate by his understanding of the relation of writer to work, spirit to subject and style.
Joubert had, in Arnold's eyes, accomplished the task which Arnold
set before himself as man and critic: "to preserve perfectly true the
balance of his soul."
Arnold chose for quotation in "Joubert" eighteen pensees which
are concerned with literature and literary criticism. Eleven are
about individual writers, all of whom are either Greek classics or
French neo-classics. Arnold's selection here is significant. He wishes
to show that Joubert admired, but did not worship, the practitioners and the restorers of "the pure and antique clearness." Particularly he wants to show that Joubert was not to be taken in by
superficial imitators of the ancients, who have the grand manner
but not the excellent subject or the noble spirit.
He quotes several pensees on Plato, saying that Plato "has never
been more truly described" (E. in C., I, 322) than by Joubert. It
is to Plato's clarity and light that Joubert gives his praise. "n eclaire,
il met de la lumiere dans nos yeux, et place en nous une clarte dont
tous les objets deviennent ensuite illumines." Plato's function is
not so much to teach us as to prepare us to learn; as a bringer of
light, he stimulates us to engage in that free play of thought which
to Arnold is the beginning of culture. But sometimes, Joubert says,
this light is not shed on anything very important; the subject is not
of an excellence to match the spirit and the manner. Readers who
have watched Plato's manner and spirit expend themselves on the

"The Pure and Antique Clearness" /

55

minutiae of the Laws would probably agree. Consequently Joubert
adds a cautionary statement, whose concluding sentence Arnold
also quotes (XXIV, i, 10): "II ya en lui plus de lumiere que d'objets, plus de forme que de matiere. 11 faut Ie respirer et non pas
s'en nourrir." It is well to be warned about any man, even Plato,
who has a tendency to substitute manner for matter; Arnold and
Joubert would agree on this.
The judgments of Joubert on "the grand century" which Arnold
quotes are minority opinions, both in Arnold's time and in Joubert's. They are presented because Arnold hopes they will do something to correct false estimates of the authors with whom they deal.
After admitting (E. in C., I, 323) that "English people have hardly
ears to hear the praises of Bossuet," he introduces a lengthy paragraph praising Bossuet. On the other hand, he considers Joubert'S
commentaries on Racine, no fewer than four of which he quotes,
to be valuable because they serve as an antidote to "the exaggerated
French estimate" of him. They will seem a harsh corrective to most
open-minded readers of Racine. Arnold even applauds a passage
(XXIV, v, 15) in which Joubert joins the names and talents of
Racine and Boileau, to whom he adds Pope as a third star of the
second magnitude. The comparison of Pope and Boileau is a critical commonplace; but Racine seems to have so little in common
with them, in matter and manner, that we are startled at this
judgment. Arnold and Joubert would answer that in nobility, or
rather in the lack of it, lies the clue to Racine's inferior stature.
"Ceux a qui Racine suffit," Joubert says (XXIV, v, 13), "sont de
pa\lvres ~es et de pauvres esprits"; and Racine deserves praise only
for succeeding in a very dubious enterprise-"pour avoir rendu:
poetiques les sentiments les plus bourgeois et les passions les plus
mMiocres." Racine did not, like Corneille, write about excellent
actions and noble passions; he presented instead, according to Joubert, pictures of the state of what G. K. Chesterton would call "potty
little minds" inflamed by turgid emotions.
Modern readers will probably find Andromaque or Hippolyte
marked less by the ignoble than by the absence of much of the
frigidity which characterizes all but the best of Corneille's plays.
Both Arnold and Joubert fail to realize that an excessive striving
after nobility leads to the diminution of the human qualities of the
"men in action" which are necessary to the very existence of a
work of art. Where nobility is involved, their critical sensitivity
frequently degenerates into finickiness. Joubert shows this defect
most clearly in his extended and exaggerated praise of Guez de
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Balzac (XXIV, iv, 5-10). Few English readers know more of Le
Socrate chretien and its author than a footnote in histories of literature tells them. Balzac's book has elegance of expression as its
only merit; the ponderous, humorless title hints at the exalted
platitudes which make up the work. But, because the platitudes
are noble (though shopworn) and the expression elegant (though
inflated), Joubert praises Balzac in this strain: "Balzac, un de nos
plus grands ecrivains, et Ie premier entre les bons, . . . est utile a
lire, a mediter, et excellent a admirer." Nothing half so enthusiastic
as this, by the way, is said in the Pensees about Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, or La Bruyere.
Arnold's overrefinement appears in a situation where it is far
more damaging to him-not in acclamation of a mediocre writer,
but in derogation of a very great one. His essay on Keats, in Essays
in Criticism, Second Series, begins with a deprecation of Keats's
sensuousness which is characteristic enough of Arnold, but which in
its concern with personality rather than poetry and its bland assumption of superiority is entirely beneath the level of real criticism. Never does Arnold appear to such complete disadvantage, as
man and critic, as when he quotes one of Keats's letters to Fanny
Brawne and goes on to evaluate it:
We have the tone, or rather the entire want of tone, the abandonment of all reticence and all dignity, of the merely sensuous man, of the man who "is passion's slave." ... It has in
its relaxed self-abandonment something underbred and ignoble, as of a youth ill brought up, without the training
which teaches us that we must put some constraint upon our
feelings and upon the expression of them. It is the sort of
love-letter of a surgeon's apprentice which one might hear
read out in a breach of promise case, or in the Divorce Court.
(E. in C., II, 75-76)
It is only just to Arnold to say that he goes on to look for "something more than sensuousness, for signs of character and virtue" in
Keats, and finds them. Condemnation was not the purpose of the
article; but it begins the article, it was never modified, and it stands
as a monument of priggishness, as absurd in its horror of the
"ignoble" as the Third Fellow's words in She Stoops to Conquer:
"0 damn anything that's low, I cannot bear it."
Some of this excessive sensibility is shown by Joubert when he
writes, and by Arnold when he quotes, such a maxim as XXIII,
128.
Avec la fievre des sens, Ie delire du coeur et la faiblesse
de l'esprit; avec les orages du temps et les grands fleaux de
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la vie, la faim, la soif, Ie deshonneur, les maladies et la mort,
on fera tout qu'on voudra des romans qui feront pleurer;
mais l'ame dit: "Vous me faites mal."
Arnold introduces his translation of this passage by saying (E. in C.,
I, 320): "Here is another sentence, worthy of Goethe, to clear the
air at one's entrance into the region of literature." It is indeed a
statement to clear the air, and the whole universe, of much of the
subject matter for literary art. Both Joubert and Arnold tend here
to confuse the events and passions of human experience with the
wrongheaded or imperfect use of them which has been made by
inferior writers of all times. So far as these misfortunes are depicted
for their own sake, unassociated with any noble action or thought
on the part of the sufferers, they are "morbid" situations in the
terms of the Preface of 1853; and novels which make us weep, and
do no more for us, are usually pollutions of the literary atmosphere.
Nevertheless, without "Ies grands Beaux de la vie" the noble actions
and thoughts necessary for good literature could scarcely exist, since
their nobility is only a measure, according to certain predetermined
standards, of the adequacy of their response to experience.
When Arnold quotes another pensee of almost equal supersensibility (XXIV, v, p. 225), however, an element of the "affreuse
realite" which Joubert decries in literature rises in him and makes
him demur mildly: "Most of us, alas! are what we must be, not
what we ought to be,-not even what we know we ought to be."
Arnold was to write later, "It is of advantage to a poet to deal with
a beautiful world" (E. in C., II, 33); he was never to agree with
Joubert that it is necessary for literature to concern itself with a
sphere "plus belle que Ie monde."
Certainly the greatest importance of "Joubert," in both the
history of Arnold's thought and that of modem literary criticism,
lies in the fact that it contains the earliest formulation of one of
his most famous dicta. After speaking of "the two orders" of writers,
those famous for all time and those known primarily to their own
generation, he says that their work "is at the bottom the same,a criticism of life. The end and aim of all literature, if one considers
it attentively, is, in truth, nothing but that" (E. in C., 1,331).
That Arnold intended this to be noted as a significant pronouncement is shown by his use of italics as well as by the high
degree of generalization. In "Joubert," however, the idea is dropped
from consideration as soon as it is stated. In later essays, most
notably "The Study of Poetry" (1880) and "Byron" (1881; both
printed in Essays in Criticism, Second Series), Arnold qualifies and
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reinforces this statement; consequently, these essays are more important than "Joubert" as manifestoes of his critical position. The
very fact that he first used the phrase in "Joubert," however, leads
to the speculation that he found in the Pensees some concept or
statement that impelled him to formulate it.
Trilling, remarking on the fact that Arnold "is writing of Joubert when he first uses the phrase" (179), says that Arnold meant
the phrase to carry only a "literal" meaning-the simple signification
of "judgment," which is one of the primary meanings attached by
the common reader to the act of criticism.
Joubert was no architect of a golden world but a critic, in a
very literal sense, of this brazen world; Arnold simply meant
that Joubert put his finger on aspects of life and judged
"Good" or "Bad." So poetry (or literature generally), Arnold
feels, sometimes by accident and implication but sometimes
by intent, says "Good" or "Bad."
Trilling opposes this "literal" interpretation to that given by H. W.
Garrod, which is "that insofar as a work possesses organic unity it
is a criticism of the chaos of life" (178).9 This sort of criticism is
judgment too, but judgment not by intent nor even necessarily by
implication, but by example.
The accuracy of Trilling's estimate of the nature of joubert's
criticism may well be questioned. In all the Pensees, only the last
long chapter concerns itself entirely with discriminating between
good and bad aspects of this present world-specifically with the
good and bad aspects of some four-score writers and their work.
The twenty-three preceding chapters are concerned-as the fervent
Platonist which Joubert was, and which Arnold recognized him to
be, was concerned-with the ideal concepts of education, government, and religion, among others, rather than with the adequacy
or inadequacy of human efforts to make them materialize. "Sans
modele, et sans un modele ideal, nul ne peut bien faire" (IX, 39). I
have remarked, in the preceding chapter, how abstract, how far
removed from actuality and contemporaneity, Joubert's writingson politics and education are, compared with Arnold's. In them
Joubert is not attempting to condemn existing evil, to uphold existing good, or even to distinguish between the two, much of the
• Most of Garrod's assessments of Arnold are contained in the collection of
lectures entitled Poetry and the Criticism of Life (London, 1931). Three of the
eight lectures deal with Arnold's poetry; a fourth, entitled "Methods of Criticism," reveals Garrod as an intelligent interpreter of Arnold's literary theory to
a new generati,m.
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time. He is trying to display the "modele ideal." In fact, he perceives
the limitations of writers who give us only judgments and condemns
such practice. "II est bon d'ecrire ses vues, ses aper~us, ses idees, mais
non pas ses jugements. L'homme qui ecrit toujours ses jugements.
place partout devant ses yeux des Calpe et des Abila. 11 en fait des
nec plus ultra, et ne va pas plus loin" (XXIII, 67). That Joubert
makes an honest attempt to conform his critical practice to his
theory is shown by the careful segregation of his "jugements" from
his other work and by their placement at the end of the book,
where their relation to what has preceded them is not so much
climactic as appendicular; they are by-products rather than endproducts of his critical method.
What Arnold himself meant by applying to literature's relation
to life the name of "criticism" is perhaps best shown in the essay
on Wordsworth. After using the phrase,lo he says:
The greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful
application of ideas to life,-to the question: How to live....
The best cure for our delusion is to let our minds rest upon
that great and inexhaustible word life, until we learn to enter
into its meaning. A poetry of revolt against moral ideas is a
poetry of revolt against life; a poetry of indifference towards
moral ideas is a poetry of indifference towards life.
(E. in C., II, 105-106)
The italics in this passage, like those in "Joubert," show us what
Arnold regards as significant; they show us that the highest degree
of importance to be found in this important phrase belongs not to
"criticism" but to "life." Our literature must "enter into the meaning" of this word; and how is this to be done? By applying to life,
its events and their movement, the "moral ideas" which life has
evolved. This application is not necessarily didactic nor philosophical; in fact, Arnold prefers that it not be, and condemns The
Excursion because it is:
The Excursion abounds with philosophy, and therefore
the Excursion is to the Wordsworth ian what it never can be
to the disinterested lover of poetry,-a satisfactory work....
But however true the doctrine may be, it has, as here presented, none of the characters of poetic truth.
(E. in C., II, 109-110)
,. In the later essays, Arnold substitutes "poetry" for "literature." This
change probably should not be regarded as particularly significant; the later
essays are about poetry. while "Joubert" is about prose. and the change of
subject made the change of word reasonable and helpful.
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The application of moral ideas must be "powerful and beautiful," because power and beauty are "the characters of poetic truth."
They are characters found in both the manner and the matter of
the best, the truly classic literature. A statement of moral ideas
without the power and beauty of poetry will probably criticize life,
in Trilling's phrase, by pointing to the Good and Bad of existence
and exemplifying the Good, if at all, only in its matter. A work
of literary art will criticize life by manifesting the Good and Bad,
in whatever combination is most suitable to its purpose, in its matter; it will also in its manner evidence such aspects of Good as
power, beauty, clarity, and nobility, to the end that life may find
in literature the means of self-understanding and self-improvement.
To what extent is Arnold's reading of Joubert connected with
his formulation of the statement and the theory that "literature is
a critcism of life"? In writing of criticism per se, Joubert indicates
that understanding rather than judgment is its aim: "La connaissance des esprits est la charme de la critique; Ie maintien des bonnes
regles n'en est que Ie metier et la derniere utilite" (XXIII, 144).
Here again, in his own words, we have something very close to a
denial of the critical aim which Trilling attributes to him. The
similarity to this of Arnold's chief aim in criticism is marked. "To
see the object as in itself it really is"-so he states it in On Translating Homer (302); and to this goal he pressed steadfastly, for the
most part, throughout his life. Occasionally, most notably in his
religious criticism, we see him turning slightly from this high intellectual aim; but this happens in an area of mental activity where
the great conflict in Arnold's nature, between Hellenism and Hebraism, was particularly hard fought, and never really won by either
side.
If, then, both the duty and the reward of criticism lie in understanding authors' works, and through their works their minds, what
are the duty and the reward of the works themselves? Joubert answers this briefly and pointedly. "n n'y a pas eu un seul siecle litteraire dont Ie gout dominant ne fut malade. Le succes des auteurs
excellents consiste a rendre agreable a des gouts malades des
ouvrages sains" (XXIII, 137). Taste in literature stems from taste
in life, and the taste and the life may both be Goubert says they
almost always are) sick. Good authors meet this sickness, not with
exhortations to be healthy or denunciations of disease, but with
"ouvrages sa ins" whose health is "agreable a des gouts malades."
Spiritual health is agreeable to the spiritually ill when it is
shown to them in simple contrast with their unfortunate state.
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do this both Good and Bad must be depicted, but Good is emphasized and Bad is treated as the effect of Good's absence. "C'est toujours avec des dartes qu'on doit representer les ombres, et avec des
beautes qu'il faut figurer les defauts" (XXIII, 79).11 Such a portrayal
of life-more idea than reality, Joubert says (XXIII, 78)-is faithful
to life in the highest sense, because it is true to the ideals which life
has evolved. This faithfulness produces a truer picture of the actualities involved, since they are related to the ideals which they
express or deny; and the spiritual accuracy, so to speak, of the
presentation ennobles the data of life. "Nos idees, en effet, sont
toujours et plus nobles, et plus belles, et plus propres a toucher
l'ame, que les objets qu'elles representent, quand, d'ailleurs, elles
les representent bien."
The conception of literature as a "criticism of life" is one of
two major critical ideas developed by Arnold in his later years, the
other being the "touchstone" theory stated in "The Study of
Poetry." Arnold's own definition of literary touchstones and their
uses can hardly be improved upon in paraphrase; it is worth reproducing unabridged.
Indeed there can be no more useful help for discovering
what poetry belongs to the class of the truly excellent, and
can therefore do us most good, than to have always in one's
mind lines and expressions of the great masters, and to apply
them as a touchstone to other poetry. Of course we are not to
require this other poetry to resemble them; it may be very
dissimilar. But if we have any tact we shall find them, when
we have lodged them well in our minds, an infallible touchstone for detecting the presence or absence of high poetic
quality, and also the degree of this quality, in all other poetry
which we may place beside them.
(E. in C., 11,12·13)
While Arnold says that no other method of judging literature
is more useful than that of the touchstones, he does not say that
all other methods are useless. Nor does he appeal to the touchstones
as if they were Urim and Thummim, which by themselves can help
us to the understanding of other poetry. They can help us to find
in other poetry "the presence or absence of high poetic quality,"
but more than this is needed for the full comprehension of any work
of art. Arnold does say (E. in C., II, 15) that "even by themselves"

11 Cf. one of Arnold's praises of Homer's style (Trans. H., 189): "He does
not rise and sink with his subject; on the contrary, his manner invests his subject, whatever his subject be, with nobleness."
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these lines can preserve our critical faculty from error; but this
statement is qualified by the clause "if we have tact and can use
them." Critics who have tact and ability are not likely, to put it
mildly, to attempt to use the touchstones in isolation, separated
alike from their sources and all other critical methods. And preservation from critical error is not necessarily synonymous with revelation of critical truth.
It seems silly to insist that Arnold does not tell us that the
memorizing of some two dozen lines of verse will unfold all poetic
mysteries for us. It would be silly, were it not for the fact that two
intelligent critics of our day have assumed that he tells us just that.
Wimsatt and Brooks say of the touchstone theory: "This open appeal to the chunklet, the sample piece of precious stuff, is a rather
startling shift toward the norm of style and away from the initial
classic thesis of 1853 that the 'action is all.' "12 First of all, a very
cursory examination would reveal that the majority of these "chunklets" deal in some way with noble actions of the mind. They picture for us the compassion of Zeus, the courage of Satan, the
Christian humility of Piccarda in the Divine Comedy. Second, and
even more obviously, these brief quotations, beautiful and noble
though they are in matter and manner, are not sufficient for the
complete and accurate presentation of noble actions and emotions.
Arnold has to explain and summarize the context from which each
passage is taken. These contexts are in every instance fit settings
for the jewels; they are also noble depictions of noble actions, and
the touchstone passages represent the poetic concentration of this
underlying nobility into a few words and lines whose matter and
manner are perfectly matched. We will find it almost impossible
to use the Miltonic touchstones, for example, if we are not familiar
with the action and spirit of all of Paradise Lost. Wimsatt and
Brooks, when they say that "to make the touchstone test it would
seem we do not have to know much if anything about the story"
which the poem tells, seem to me to be clearly in error. 13
>2 Literary Criticism, p. 445.
,. This statement is connected with a notable inaccuracy in reporting. The
authors are writing specifically of Chaucer's "Prioress' Tale"; earlier in the
paragraph they speak of a line from another of Chaucer's poems as a "touchstone slightly misquoted." The fact is that none of the quotations from Chaucer
in "The Study of Poetry" are presented as touchstones. All they can give us,
Arnold says, is "the charm of Chaucer's verse" (E. in C., II, 22); they cannot
serve as a guide to what is excellent in other poetry. "Chaucer is not one of
the great classics," Arnold says, because he has not "high and excellent seriousness, which Aristotle assigns as one of the grand virtues of poetry" (24). Wimsatt
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There is in Joubert's Pensees a paragraph (XXIII, 217) which
embodies an idea almost identical with the touchstone theory. The
only real difference is in the final clauie, wherein Joubert tends to
extravagance in praise of short passages-the same extravagance,
very nearly, of which Wimsatt and Brooks accuse Arnold.
Quelques mots dignes de memo ire peuvent suffire pour
illustrer un grand esprit. II y a telle pensee que contient
l'essence d'un livre tout entier; telle phrase qui ales beautes
d'un vaste ouvrage; telle unite qui equivaut it un nombre;
enfin telle simplicite si achevee et si parfaite, qu'elle egale, en
merite et en excellence, une grande et glorieuse composition.
Joubert speaks of "mots dignes de memoire"; Arnold wants the
touchstones to be "always in one's mind." Joubert says these words
will suffice "pour illustrer un grand esprit" in their author; Arnold
goes further and asserts that the touchstones will help us to find
"the presence or absence of high poetic quality . . . in all other
poetry which we may place beside them." It does not seem too
sweeping to say that the lines from the Iliad, the Divine Comedy,
and Paradise Lost which Arnold quotes contain much of the "essence"-in style and in attitude toward the subject-of the books:
the loftiness and simplicity of the first, the power and devoutness of
the second, and the intellectual clarity and emotional intensity of
the third. Certainly they all contain "beauties" in profusion within
their narrow bounds.
The keystone of the arch is the "simpIicite si achevee et si
parfaite." So highly does Joubert regard this quality that he says
the sentences, lines, and other passages which manifest it are equal
in value to the finest complete works of art. This is so because true
simplicity is itself "achevee" in several senses-complete and entire,
labored at and perfected. It is the perfect relationship of matter
and manner, and to Joubert perfection within a small compass is
as meritorious as (perhaps because in some ways more difficult than)
perfection on a large scale. (Part of this attitude is of course owing
to his partiality for his own literary form, the aphorism.)
Now it may be noted that all Arnold's touchstones are examples
of the "grand style simple." None are much affected by the condensation and difficult appearance which are the distinguishing
marks of the severe. One may reasonably think that their simplicity
and Brooks recognize that this high seriousness is simply a rephrasing of the
ideal of nobility in matter and simplicity in manner; what they do not seem
to understand is that the ideal cannot be separated from the touchstone theory
and that consequently Arnold's critical position has "shifted" very little.
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-a term which here may well be extended to include their simplification, their power to epitomize the quality of the works to which
they belong-was in large part responsible for their choice as touchstones. Arnold will not say with Joubert that the touchstones equal
their sources in worth. He does say that they are more than adequate
indications of the worth of their sources and of many other works;
and their simple completeness of tone and style, their summary
capacity, is what makes them so supremely useful as literary points
of reference.
From first to last, in speaking of the literary criticism of Joubert
and Arnold, the watchwords of this study have been "simplicity,"
"clarity," and "nobility." The frequency of their use provides an
index of the consistency of the two men's critical approaches to
literature. Arnold seeks primarily the first, while Joubert shows a
predilection for the second; both, however, think of simplicity and
clarity as subordinate to the nobility of matter and manner which
alone can make a work of art truly great. It is by their nobility that
all works of art will stand or fall; and Arnold and Joubert agree in
ascribing the highest measure of nobility (and of simplicity and
clarity as well) to the Greek classics. They even, on occasion, fall
prey to the same danger inherent in a respect for nobility: the tendency to prefer passionless frigidity to an accurate portrayal of
emotion. While it is certain that much of Arnold's critical theory
originated prior to and quite independent of his reading of Joubert, the points of similarity and sympathy remain interesting to
consider; and the possibilities of real influence, in connection with
the "criticism of life" and the touchstones, add significance to their
relationship.

5

I

"Rest

in

the Light"

La sagesse est Ie repos dans la lumiere.
Joseph Joubert, Pensees, II: 2
A fugitive and gracious light he seeks,
Shy to illumine; and I seek it too ....
Men gave thee nothing; but this happy quest,
If men esteemed thee feeble, gave thee power,
If men procured thee trouble, gave thee rest.
Matthew Arnold, "Thyrsis"
Up to this point, it has been the design of this paper to show
specific areas of thought in which shared sympathies bound Arnold
to Joubert. If those relationships which may be more strictly
termed "influences" are comparatively little discussed, the reason
is not that I doubt their existence but that, except as revealed in
strictly verbal similarities, such relationships are rarely susceptible
of proof in any writer's work. A contemporary English critic, writing
specifically of the novel, has uttered words of caution which should
be remembered by all who attempt to deal with the relation of one
writer and his work to another.
The whole question of literary influence, the indebtedness
of one writer to others, is much more difficult and complex
than some literary historians seem to think. The apparent
influence of an older novelist on a later may, in fact, be no
influence at all, in the sense that the later writer's work would
have been in some way different had he not known his forebear's, but rather a relation between affinities.!
It is not likely that, had Arnold never read Joubert, the general
tenor of his criticism would be different from what it is. Arnold was
forty years old when he first read Joubert; much of his poetry was
already written, a few of his critical principles in literature were
already stated. The fact that quotations from Joubert appear in
1 Walter Allen, The English Novel: A Short Critical History (New York,
1958), p. 42.
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some of his later works ("The Function of Criticism at the Present
Time," Culture and Anarchy) indicates pretty clearly that the approval expressed in "Joubert" is more than mere passing admiration or even sympathy; the passages in question seem to have given
point and force to his statements if if not necessarily direction to his
thoughts. The many similarities in the two men's approaches to
particular aspects of life are certainly "affinities," and they are
important as such to students of Arnold; but similarity obviously
need not be "influence" in Allen's sense.
If, however, we give to the word a somewhat more general
meaning-if we use "influence" here to mean a force in the activities
of Arnold's mind-we can find evidence of Joubert's importance in
the Note·Books. These are the collections of maxims which Arnold
copied out, week by week and year by year, to meditate and act
upon. With one exception,2 none of the pensees which he entered
in the Note-Books appear in his published work; this may seem
startling, but it does not diminish the value of the Note-Books citations. Paradoxically, the Note-Books are useful in the study of the
literary influences which Arnold experienced largely because the
kind of influence they record is not strictly literary.
In "The Study of Poetry" Arnold declares that literature is at
its best when it attempts to provide us with a solution of the problem of "how to live." The sentences and paragraphs Arnold copied
and often recopied in his commonplace books were for him hints
toward just such a practical result. Like Joubert's reading of Nicole,
the Note-Books were undertaken "with a direct view of practice"
(E. in C., I, 323), and they preserve a part of Arnold's inner life
which was far more than merely intellectual. The editors, in their
Preface, rightly emphasize the essentially devotional character of
the Note-Books.
As the years went by he more and more regarded life as a

problem of attention. Right attending becomes right living.
The note-books mark Arnold's consecration to a life larger
than that of the poet and essayist. Whatever one thinks of his
studies in religious subjects, few men have tried harder to
attend to the great language of faith and to make it the word
of their daily lives. The note-books can rightly take their
place, we feel, among the best of the books of devotion-the
more so, because the devotional parts are so rightly and naturally blended with so much else. The quest for piety is mixed
• XVI, 17 appears in "The Literary Influence of Academies" (E. in. C., 1.71) .
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with fine Attic salt and the bright things of the secular world.
But the piety is there.
(J\T
B"')
1\ •
., XU1
Thirteen of Joubert's aphorisms, quoted and requoted a total of
thirty-nine times, are in the Note-Books. They occupy more space
than quotations from Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Milton, or the Book
of Common Prayer, to name some other sources whence Arnold
drew much inspiration. Perhaps this is the final testimonial to the
importance of the Pensees in the shaping of Arnold's life and
thought.
At first glance it may seem difficult to find "the great language
of faith" in the selections from Joubert which are found in the
Note-Books. They are sober, simple reflections on morality, psychology, and experience. One, which is repeated no fewer than ten
times, appearing first in 1862 and last in 1865 (N.B., 15 and 413),
will show how these quotations spoke to Arnold-as the voice of
experience which he had shared or could profit by. Joubert originally included this sentence in a letter which Sainte-Beuve reprinted, and it was apparently in Sainte-Beuve's book that Arnold
first found it.8 It states: "J'eprouve que rien n'augmente autant de
decouragement que l'oisivete." In this Arnold evidently found a
verbalization of an emotional state which was no less familiar to
him than to Joubert. He knew discouragement frequently, and in
his middle years almost constantly, in the course of his work as
inspector of schools; his Letters give ample proof of this.4 Several
of them also show his despondency was deepened by "oisivete" -not
physical idleness, which he never allowed himself nor was allowed,
but the idleness of the mind which accompanied the days crammed
with routine tasks. Joubert's discouragement and idleness both
were the result of his lifelong invalidism, which rarely permitted
him to be active, in body or mind, more than a few hours a day.
By means of quite different experiences, the two men arrived at a
similar conclusion about one facet of human existence; and Arnold
seems to have been comforted and sustained by contemplating
Joubert's reaction to it, in literature and life.
Another pensee, three times repeated, probably helped confirm
Arnold in his opinion that life is "a problem of attention": "Le
• Chateaubriand et son Groupe litteraire sous l'Empire (Paris, 1861), II,
275. Arnold owned a copy of this book (N.B., 413) .
• One example will suffice. In a letter to his mother, dated March 24, 1862,
be writes: "The gray hairs on my head are becoming more and more numerous,
and I sometimes grow impatient of getting old amidst a press of occupations
and labour for which, after all, I was not born" (Letters, I, 220) .
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soin de bien dire la verite et d'apprivoiser l'attention est un devoir,
une fonction du sage et un marque de sa bonte" (XI, 25). Another
was entered in the Note-Books six times: "Tout ce qui multiplie les
noeuds qui attachent l'homme a l'homme Ie rend meiIleur et plus
heureux" (V, 60). This must have aroused a response in a man
whose poetry is concerned with the isolation of men from each
other to an almost excessive degree. The thought hints toward a
cure for the state of mind and society deplored in "The Buried
Life," and perhaps helped Arnold to formulate his theory of the
State as a unifying and ennobling social force.
It was mentioned earlier in this essay that Arnold embodied his
own cultural dichotomy and was both a Hebraist and a Hellenist.
A Hebraist at bottom, he realized that his England needed Hellenism badly, and he spent much of his time perfecting his Hellenistic side and serving as a missionary for Hellenism. Yet the nature
of Hellenism is not evangelistic; what Arnold's life and his criticism
-especially his social and religious criticism-show us is Hellenism
celebrated in an essentially Hebraistic fashion. The same critic who
said in "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time" that true
criticism is marked by "disinterestedness" (E. in C., I, 20) wrote an
essay, in the political phase of his career, on such a piece of legislative minutiae as a Burials Bill. Because his times were out of
joint, and he felt called upon to spend most of his time and effort
in straightening them, Arnold often had to put the ideal of disinterestedness aside.
As a Hebraist, Arnold admired Joubert's concern for moral and
religious values. He felt that Joubert, particularly in his emphasis
on chastity and modesty, provided a Hebraistic corrective for the
French nation, so prone to worship the Goddess Lubricity. But he
saw that Joubert was a natural Hellenist, and that he maintained
his spiritual detachment almost without effort. Because Joubert
could be disinterested and yet bring his critical powers to bear on
the improvement of human life, Arnold praises him for having
kept "the balance of his soul" perfectly true.
"La sagesse," Joubert says simply, "est Ie repos dans la lumiere."
Rest in the light-calm devotion to the tasks of intellect and quiet
enjoyment of its pleasures-is for Arnold, too, one of the happy
characteristics of Hellenism. Using a phrase whose origin he attributes to Carlyle, he calls it the sense of being "at ease in Zion"
(C. and A., 128). Several of Arnold's favorite writers have this repose, which as it appears in their style may best be termed a kind
of calm perspicacity. It is found throughout the Sacra Privata of
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Thomas Wilson, the eighteenth-century Bishop of Sodor and Man,
which Arnold loved and lived by5 and which he quoted extensively
in Culture and Anarchy and his religious books. It is one of the
distinguishing features of Spinoza's character, though hardly of his
outward life; Arnold must have admired the way in which a man
far more embroiled than he was could reach such heights of equanimity.6 It breathes through the humble assurance of the counsels
of the Imitation. And-though it is evidenced considerably less in
his writings than in Arnold's own-Arnold felt that Arthur Hugh
Clough, by his devotion to things of the mind, had achieved a
similar spiritual tranquillity. If "the great language of faith" is
interpreted to mean a fidelity, in manner and matter, to the intellectual and spiritual quest, all of these surely possess it.
"Thyrsis" is one of the great elegies of the English language; it
is also, as is "The Scholar-Gypsy," one of the language's greatest
hymns to intellect, its powers and its joys. Throughout most of his
life Clough, Thyrsis, had followed his mind as his chief guide. In
so doing, he left behind the world and its desires, and even many
of his friends. 7 Arnold likens both Clough and himself, in their
search for truth, to the legendary Scholar-Gypsy; and the description
applies equally aptly to Joubert and to all other true Hellenists.
A fugitive and gracious light he seeks,
Shy to illumine; and I seek it too.
This does not come with houses or with gold,
With place, with honor, and a flattering crew;
'Tis not in the world's market bought and soldBut the smooth-slipping weeks
Drop by, and leave its seeker still untired;
Out of the heed of mortals he is gone,
He wends unfollowed, he must house alone;
Yet on he fares, by his own heart inspired.
("Thyrsis,"1l.201-210)
5 In the Note-Books, sixty-eight quotations from the Sacra Privata may be
found; counting repetitions, Bishop Wilson is responsible for 120 entries.
• Cf. E. in C., I, 372: "A philosopher who professed that knowledge was its
own reward, a devotee who professed that the love of God was its own reward,
this philosopher and this devotee believed in what he said. . . . It was in this
spirit that he lived; and this spirit gives to all he writes . . . a kind of sacred
solemnity." He pays the highest compliment he can to Spinoza when he says
that his life and character were "in the grand style" (374).
• The keynote of his character is sounded first in line 40 (Poems, I, 241)_
After describing his own reluctance to leave Oxford and the beauties of its
surrounding countryside, Arnold says: "But Thyrsis of his own will went away."
Clough resigned his fellowship at Oriel in 1848 because increasing doctrinal
doubts would not allow him to make the professions of faith required to retain
it. For the complete story, see Goldie Levy, Arthur Hugh Clough (London,
1938) , pp. 66-68.
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In the next stanza is the greater part of the passage quoted at the
head of this chapter, which tells us that the labor of the mind is its
own rest and reward.
Much of Joubert's Titre preliminaire is given over to statements
of the difficulties of the intellectual search-some caused by his
constitutional feebleness, others by his uncompromising idealism.
Yet the difficulties, more numerous perhaps for Joubert than for
most men, never blinded him to the blessings of the search. "Nos
moments de lumiere sont des moments de bonheur," he assures us
(XI, 9). We can note in "Thyrsis" a somewhat parallel thought, indicated by the adjectives applied to "light" in line 201. It is "fugitive" because we know it fully only at intervals, at "moments"; it
is also "gracious" because in those fleeting instants it bestows upon
the seeker the gifts of joy, peace, and certitude ("bonheur").
In "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," Arnold
states what he believes the "true spiritual work" of criticism to be:
"to keep man from a self-satisfaction which is retarding and vulgarising, to lead him towards perfection, by making his mind dwell
upon what is excellent in itself, and the absolute beauty and fitness
of things" (E. in C., I, 22-23). Practical considerations, immediate
social and literary problems to be solved, frequently hindered Arnold from fulfilling this ideal; they rarely hindered Joubert, whom
the circumstances of life allowed to dwell more uninterruptedly
with ideals. Because he achieved Arnold's ideal, Arnold's respect for
him was augmented almost to reverence at times, and it is summed
up in the sentence (E. in C., I, 330): "He is the most prepossessing
and convincing of witnesses to the good of loving light." Joubert
convinces not by arguments and literary devices, but by the unity
of his life and his art. He had mastered "the problem of attention"
in both. Never forgetting the values of Hebraism, the standards of
religion and morality, he always brought the light of Hellenism to
bear upon the problems of life. His allegiance to light, to understanding, was well-nigh complete; and this insured his importance
to Arnold. The words of Arnold about the Scholar-Gypsy's fabled
immortality are a poetic parallel to his concluding paragraph on
Joubert, for devotion is the reason for the survival of both.
Thou hadst one aim, one business, one desire!
Else wert thou long since numbered with the dead.
("The Scholar-Gypsy," 11. 15], 152)8

• Poems, 1,233-234.
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Appendix

Following are the translations of those pensees of Joseph Joubert
which appear in the text of this study. The scope of the translations
is restricted to quoted material only; if only part of a lengthy
pensee is quoted, the translation does not embrace more than
the quotation. Phrases which receive no more than a passing reference in the text are not translated.
Wherever possible, Arnold's own versions are used and are
identified as his. All other versions are by the author of the study.
The pensees appear here in the order in which they are quoted.
CHAPTER 1
XXIII, 84 (p. 1)
In the pure realm of art, a subject must be illuminated by one
single ray of light, shining from one point only.
CHAPTER 2
1,60 (p. 8)
Religion is the poetry of the heart; its enchantments are useful
in our lives; it gives us happiness and goodness.
XI, 4 (p. 8)
Truth does not and cannot come from ourselves. In everything
that is spiritual, it comes from God .... We must first consult God,
then wise men and our own souls, in spiritual things.
XII, 32 (p. 10)
How many men become abstract in order to seem profound!
Most abstract terms are shadows to hide a void.

I, 9 (p. 10)
The God of metaphysics is no more than an idea; but the God
of religions, the Creator of heaven and earth, the sovereign Judge
of actions and thoughts, is a power.
1,6 (Arnold's translation) (p. 10)
May I say it? It is not hard to know God, provided one will not
force oneself to define him.

72

Appendix

/

73

1, 122 (p. 10)
It is their confidence in themselves, and a secret belief in their
personal infallibility, that are displeasing in certain theologians.
I, 135 (Arnold's translation) (p. 10)
The 1ansenists erec~ "grace" ~nt<? a kind. of fo~rth l?erson of th~
Trinity. They are, wIthout thu;tkmg or lOten.dmg It, qua term·
tarians. St. Paul and St. Augustme, too exclusIvely stUdIed, have
done all the mischief. Instead of "grace," say help, succour, a divine
influence, a dew of heaven; then one can come to a right understanding. The word "grace" is a sort of talisman, all the baneful
spell of which can be broken by translating it. The trick of personifying words is a fatal source of mischief in theology.

I, 133 (p. 11)
The Jansenists love discipline better than goodness; the Jesuits
prefer goodness to discipline. The former are essentially learned,
the latter essentially pious.
I, 137 (p. 11)
Philosophers are tolerant of Jansenism because Jansenism is a
species of philosophy.
I, 101 (p. 12)
The idea of God is a light, a light which guides and gladdens us.
1,28 (p. 14)
Does God consider fine thoughts equal in worth to fine actions?
Will those who have sought fine thoughts, and delighted in them,
have a recompense? Will the philosopher and the politician be
rewarded for their projects, as the good man will be for his good
deeds? Have their useful works merit in God's eyes, like good
morality? It may well be; but the reward of the first is not as sure
as that of the second, and it is not the same.
1,61 (Arnold's translation) (p. 14)
Piety is not a religion, though it is the soul of all religions. A
man has not a religion simply by having pious inclinations, any
more than he has a country simply by having philanthropy. A man
has not a country until he is a citizen in a state, until he undertakes
to follow and uphold certain laws, to obey certain magistrates, and
to adopt certain ways of living and acting.
I, 3 (p. 15)
We know God by piety, the one inclination of our souls whereby
God is brought to our door and enabled to show himself to us.
I, 34 (p. 15)
Piety is a sublime wisdom, surpassing all others; a kind of
genius, giving wings to the spirit.
1,2 (p. 16)
In this task of imagining God, the chief means is the human
form; the end is light, a splendid light.
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I, 15 (p. 16)
God multiplies intelligence, which spreads like fire, continually.
Light a thousand torches from one, the flame of the first will remain
the same.
I, 17 (p. 16)
God speaks to us in a whisper and enlightens us in secret. To
hear him we must be inwardly silent; to see his light, we must close
our senses and look only within ourselves.
I, 100 (p. 16)
God enlightens those who think often of him and lift their eyes
toward him.
I, 89 (p. 18)
Close your eyes, and you will see.
I, 113 (p. 18)
Each day one must pray to God, binding one's thought to his
purifying light.
1,33 (p. 18)
Heaven is for those who think about it.
1,46 (p. 18)
To think of God is an action.
I, 49 (p. 19)
We are enlightened because God shines upon us; we are made
straight because he touches us. God shines on us in light; he corrects
us in law. This law, felt and not discerned, serves as a standard to
which we may compare our judgments on all things which should
not be valued at the estimate of the senses.
I, 16 (p. 22)
God works only for eternity.
1,53 (p. 22)
He is the light and the sun. It is he who illumines everything:
"In thy light shall we see light."
CHAPTER 3
XIV, 3 (p. 24)
The multitude loves the multitude, and government by plurality; the wise love unity.
XVIII, 5 (p. 24)
What deplorable times, when each man weighs all things in his
own balance and walks, as the Bible says, by the light of his own
lamp!
XV, 5 (Arnold's translation) (p. 26)
Let your cry be for free souls rather even than for free men.
Moral liberty is the one vitally important liberty, the one lib-
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erty which is indispensable; the other liberty is good and salutary
only so far as it favours this.
XV, 14 (Arnold's translation) (p. 26)
Subordination is in itself a better thing than independence. The
one implies order and arrangement; the other implies only selfsufficiency with isolation . . . . The one means harmony, the other
a single tone; the one is the whole; the other is but the part.
XV, 15 (Arnold's translation) (p. 26)
Liberty! liberty! In all things let us have justice, and we shall
have enough liberty.
XV, 13 (p. 26)
Public liberty can only be established by the sacrifice of private
liberties. In this admirable arrangement, the strong must give up
a part of their power, and the weak a part of their hope .... A liberty diminished, communicated, and expanded is worth more than
that which is entire and concentrated.
XV, I (p.28)
The rights of the people come not from themselves, but from
justice. Justice comes from order, and order comes from God himself.
XV, 12 (p. 29)
Of what benefit is liberty to wise and good men, who live under
the empire of reason, and are slaves to duty?
XIX, I (p. 31)
The idea of order in all things-literary, moral, political, and
religious order-is the basis of all education.
XIV, 4 (p. 32)
Those who would govern love the republic; those who would
be well governed love only monarchy.
XIV, 17 (p. 32)
All legitimate authority should respect its extent and its limits.
XVI, 92 (one sentence only) (p. 32)
Is not endurance a sign of excellence in laws, as utility and
clarity are indications of truth in philosophical systems?
XIV, 20 (p. 33)
Political systems have need of elasticity. They lose it when everything is regulated by laws fixed and inflexible.
XVIII, 35 (p. 35)
In politics, we are almost all filled with a fire which only agitates us, and with a light which dazzles us and does no more.
XVIII, 36 (p. 36)
"The legislative power," "the executive power," and so onthese are only ciphers. The methods and something like the lan-
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guage of algebra have been taken into politics, and even into ethics.
Abstract words are used instead of letters; we combine them, and
believe ourselves to be enlightened because we have rearranged
the shadows. And in truth these novel words and obscure notions
are to the mind only shadows without bodies, without reality or
beauty.
XIX, 34 (p. 39)
The direction of our intellect is more important than its
progress.
XIX, 12 (p. 39)
Remember well that education is not merely the adornment of
the memory and the enlightenment of the understanding; it should
above all be concerned with the direction of the will.
XIX, 25 (p. 39)
Show children only that which is simple, for fear of corrupting
their judgment.
XIX, 39 (p. 39; see page 47 for continuation)
For children, in literature, nothing but what is simple.
CHAPTER 4
XXIII, 36 (Arnold's translation) (p.4I)
Be profound with clear terms and not with obscure terms. What
is difficult will at last become easy; but as one goes deep into things,
one must still keep a charm, and one must carry into these dark
depths of thought, into which speculation has only recently penetrated, the pure and antique clearness of centuries less learned than
ours, but with more light in them.
XXI, 29 (p. 45)
The essence of poetry is a supreme clarity.
XXII, 115 (p. 45)
Purity, propriety of expression, and clarity are essential to the
pensee. Transparence is its beauty. To make the pensee appear natural, art is necessary. Sentiment is out of place; it is heat, the pensee
is light.
XXIV, v, 35 (p. 46, fn. 3)
[Mme. de Stael's] imagination had been seduced by something
more dazzling than truth. The brilliance of the flames misled her.
. . . Passions in her eyes became invested with dignity and glory.
XXIII, 38 (p. 46)
Affectation belongs above all to language; pretense, to the writer's vanity. By the first, the author seems to say I wish to be clear, or
I wish to be exact, and he does not displease. By the other he appears to say I would be brilliant, and we deride him. As a general
rule, whenever a writer thinks chiefly of his readers, we pardon
him; when he thinks chiefly of himself, we punish him.
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XXIII. 40 (p. 47)
[The naturally exquisite is] that expression which is just, simple.
best suited to the subject at hand. to the writer's thought. to the
emotion that animates him. to what precedes it and what follows
it, to the place which awaits the word.
XXII. 110 (p. 47)
When the image hides the object. and a body is made out of
shadows; when the expression pleases us so much that we are disinclined to penetrate to the sense beyond; when the symbol absorbs
all our attention-then we are interrupted in our journey. and we
mistake a highway for a resting-place, because a bad guide is
leading us.
XIX, 39 (p. 47; see page 39 for preceding sentence)
... Simplicity has never corrupted taste. It is incompatible with
everything that is faulty in poetry.
XXIV. iv. II (p. 48)
We must bring simplicity to bear upon profusion; this is our
task in all the arts.
Prel., p. 95 (p. 48)
It is not my sentences that I polish. but my ideas.
XXII, 82 (p. 52)
The humblest style conveys beauty. if it is the expression of a
great and noble soul.
XXIV, v, 8 (p. 52)
Far more perfect that Corneille, yet less grand, Racine should
be less revered.
XXIV. v. 7 (p. 52)
Corneille is reproached for his heroic language and emotions.
But to raise ourselves, to keep ourselves unsoiled by earthly baseness, we need all kinds of stilts.
XXI. 36 (p. 53)
Serious verse must move forward with long strides and not with
tripping footsteps. Swift movement. when it is depicted, should be
like that of a Homeric god: "he takes a step. and he is there."
XXIV, i. 1 (p. 53)
There will never be an acceptable translation of Homer whose
words are not chosen with art and full of variety, novelty. and
harmony. In other words. the style should be as antique and unadorned as the manners, the actions, and the characters it depicts.
In our modern style. Homer grimaces, and his heroes are monsters
who try to be grave and proud.
XXIV, i, 10 (Arnold's translation in brackets) (p. 54)
[... he puts light into our eyes. and fills us with a clearness by
which all objects afterwards become illuminated.] ... He has more
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light than he has things enlightened, more style than matter. [It is
good to breathe his air, but not to live upon him.]
XXIV, v, 13 (Arnold's translation) (p. 55)
Those who find Racine enough for them are poor souls and
poor wits.
XXIV, iv, 5-10 passim. (p. 56)
Balzac, one of our greatest writers, and first among those who
write well, ... is useful to read and to meditate upon, and excellent
to admire.
XXIII, 128 (Arnold's translation) (p. 57)
With the fever of the senses, the delirium of the passions, the
weakness of the spirit; with the storms of the passing time and with
the great scourges of human life,-hunger, thirst, dishonour, diseases, and death,-authors may as long as they like go on making
novels which shall harrow our hearts; but the soul says all the
while, "You hurt me."
IX, 39 (p. 58)
Without an ideal model, nothing can be well made.
XXIII, 67 (p. 59)
It is well to give views, insights, ideas, but not judgments. The
man who is always giving judgments is setting the Pillars of Hercules
forever before his eyes. He creates a ne plus ultra and will not go
beyond.
XXIII, 144 (p. 60)
Acquaintance with other intellects is the charm of criticism; the
maintenance of rules is only its machinery and its least utility.
XXIII, 137 (p.60)
There has not been a single period in which the dominant literary taste has not been unhealthy. The success of the best authors
consists in making healthy works palatable to sick tastes.
XXIII, 79 (p. 61)
One should always represent shadows with clarity, and describe
defects with beauty.
XXIII, 78 (p. 61)
In fact, our ideas are always more noble, more beautiful, and
more capable of touching the soul than the objects they represent,
if they represent them well.
XXIII, 217 (p. 63)
A few words worthy of memory may suffice to characterize a
great mind. Sometimes a single thought may contain the essence of
an entire book, a single sentence have the beauty of an extensive
work, a single unit be as valuable as several. And there is a simplicity so finished and so perfect that it equals in excellence a noble
and elaborate composition.
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CHAPTER 5

II, 2 (p. 65)
WIsdom is rest in the light.
Quotation from a letter (p. 67)
I have proved that nothing increases discouragement so much
as idleness.

XI, 25 (p. 68)
Carefulness in telling the truth and in regulating the attention
is a duty, a function of the wise man and a sign of his goodness.
V, 60 (p. 68)
Everything which increases the links that bind man to his fel·
lows makes him better and happier.
XI, 9 (p. 70)
Our moments of light are moments of happiness.

